The Ardennes, 1944-1945: Hitler's Winter Offensive Hardcover – November 3, 2014

From a Review Perspective:Christer Bergström has researched and brought together a comprehensive view of the Battle of the Bulge predominantly from the German prospective but with supporting detail about the Americans. What is noteworthy is the extent to which he addresses the entire campaign including air, supply and associated plans and actions away from the Ardennes front itself. I think other reviewers have covered the ground on many of its pluses and minuses. Yes, at times it is tedious but after a couple of pages you are enlightened with new information and you are very glad you read through. For example, the post Christmas though January engagements that were fought at terrible costs were very detailed and brought home the tenacity of the Germans and the price paid by the Americans. This time frame has been given very limited exposure until late in books such as Bergström's and there are still excellent books recently published that don't cover this timeframe of the battle at all. Because of the overall quality of the detail, the German perspective and the way the Autumn Mist is treated as a campaign, to me The Ardennes 1944-1945: Hitler's Winter Offensive is one that you need to buy or at least read.From a Comment PerspectiveAs mentioned above there are many books on the Battle of the Bulge and related volumes but here are four that for me touch on the Bulge and its ramifications:- Obviously The Ardennes 1944-1945: Hitler's Winter Offensive by Christer Bergström.- Snow and Steel by Peter Caddice-Adams. Published this past December. Scholarly with new enlightening information. He teated post Bagstone in virtually 16 pages but what really is insightful is his treatment of the cold war timeframe where NATO planned and exercised for a potential Soviet offensive through the Fulda Gap, an area, geographically very much like the Ardennes. I would conjecture due to the Bulge and Germany's experience with Russian armor, that such an event, the damage it would cause and the reaction time needed to respond was taken very seriously. He states he was in Return Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises while he was in the service.In the 70's I was in the Navy and our job was to get resources across the Atlantic, through an expected submarine and air threat, that were not to go by air. I was in one REFORGER exercise. The West spent a lot of money anticipating a Soviet attack modeled on the Bulge.- The GI Offensive in Europe: The triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 by Peter R. Mansoor published in 1999: Why this is interesting and related to the Bulge. The book is about building and training US division for the war against Germany and too a certain degree about establishing a doctrine that could be relied on at all unit levels to fight consistently. As one reads understanding early on that army manpower was capped relatively arbitrarily early on at 99 divisions for both Germany and Japan and the process of staffing and training divisions was so often short and inconsistent, nor was shipment of equipment planned or executed smoothly.So when divisions arrived on the continent they certainly were not front line ready, not seasoned and a mechanism was not in place to transfer front line knowledge/ experience to incoming units at any level. With the expansion of the fronts after Normandy and the invasion of Southern France, we started a manpower draw that was staggering which in itself was amplified by casualties and battles such as Hurtgen Forest and Aachen. So with the risks / incorrect intelligence picture / command egos and weather that factored into the strategic picture, it is no surprise that units such as the 106th infantry had no traction and surrendered while even new units rushed over from England and fighting under Patton were still figuring out how to fight.On the doctrine side, he clearly states that from, based on WWI experience, the American army built themselves with significant and flexible artillery capability within a division. So an early part of Doctrine was basically to use artillery whoever possible. Once in France and provided with tactical air and learning how to work with it, units had another tool to work with. So Bergström's items on how the German's saw the American's fighting day-to-day, dovetails pretty well with Manor's explanation of established doctrine. (And if I'm a new unit, in the freezing day after day cold walking through knee deep snow with MG 42's ahead of me, you are darn right I'm calling for artillery, air and/or armor. And if I'm armor, I'm being pretty cautious especially in "set piece" attacks.) Manor has a lot of other interesting items in this book but basically he says that it wasn't until march / April that all divisions seemed to understand how to employ all their capabilities. But the war had ended too.- Monty, the Field Marshal, 1944-1976 by Negel Hamilton 1986. Last but not least read the first 90-120 pages of this 3rd volume of the set. It's old but provides a definitively special view of the Battle through Montgomery's eyes . Hamilton is true to his subject but provides good context as he tracks Montgomery through the war and in doing so uses the actual signals sent / received by Montgomery (nice source documents). In the 90-120 pages I would suggest is worth a few hours, he basically leads one through the observations that Montgomery saw and communicated the German's regrouping in the Ardennes region and thought the thinness of Bradly's lines in that area were extremely risky. Once the attack began, her took quick action to protect the bridges over the Meuse and thought Patton was "stretching it" on his brag about reaching Bastogne in three days and his ability to make further gains after that because his troops, tired and stretched logistically had basically lost what we would call today their true "combat power". He was pretty well correct in this case and Hamilton makes it clear, that Montgomery's forward TAC HQ and information flow were far, far superior to Bradley's etc. as he was always forward and used the American army even to him very well to clean up the Bulge. It's an interesting contrast to get what is pretty much the British viewpoint.Those four book together provide interesting contrasts and permit the reader to, use a recent term, conflate the information to get a nice comprehensive picture from small units up through the supreme commander, Eisenhower

Of the six new "Bulge" books that have been released in the last two months, this book at least from my perspective of favoring battlefield operations and analysis is most impressive. In addition to this inspiring story is an equalily impressive map set and a large photo gallery. With the book having dimensions of nearly 9 in. by 12 in., most of the maps are large and the many photos will not overpower the story.The book opens with three introductory chapters that covers the prehistory of the sector, the planning of the German offensive and then the preparations for the attack. The next three chapters takes up the offensive for at least the first week of the campaign. The time period varies, being longer in some sectors. The battle actions begins with 5th PzA sector against the 28th ID defenders, followed by the 7th Army attacking 4th ID and finally the 6th SS PzA as tail end Charlie attacking in the north against 99th ID. The next two chapters covers the air war followed by the siege of Bastogne and collectively these five chapters consume the bulk of the offensive. The last three chapters covers the action starting with the new year and you'll read about the Operation Northwind to the south of 1st Army, the beginning of the Allied counter offensive that will eventually push the German forces out of the Ardennes. Coverage ends at the end of January.Mr Bergstrom has a military bearing and I enjoyed his dialog as he describes the military events. He sets up the combat engagements very well, using a no nonsense approach in describing the combatants facing each other, mission parameters, the deployments being used, axes of attack and flanking positions if any. Terrain and weather conditions are also often included in the mix. The avid student of the operational will really appreciate this writing style. The combat coverage frequently drives down to company level or combat group level and when the skirmish is larger, battalion and regiment level is usually provided.Military profiles of key officers and men of both sides are included and provide additional insight into the decisions made on the battlefield. Interesting sidebars are also provided throughout the book that are related to the battlefield action but not directly a part of the battle action.To enhance his narrative, many snippets of after action reports are included as well as quotes from key people in the campaign. Also at the end of each chapter, a helpful summary of conclusions and results are mentioned. This end summary will help clarify any concerns you might have while reading the chapter. Coverage is fairly even between the two combatants, neither side being permanently overshadowed.In addition to an expert narrative, the author has included twenty excellent B+W maps. These maps are visually appealing and well populated and the reader will be able to gleam a lot from them. These maps have been wisely chosen in with regards to sector and time. These maps could be used as reference when reading any book on the "Bulge". The large photo gallery which, includes helpful captions, is also an asset to the book. The book also contains a nice set of color plates of tanks and planes that were involved in the campaign. The expert Notes Section, Bibliography, Appendix can also be of good value if further research is desired. The author has used a wide range of primary and secondary sources and the results of his efforts are clearly evident.The narrative ends with Conclusions. This chapter is also creditworthy (for the most part) as the author who is clearly sympathetic to the German cause, gives final appraisal and summary to the campaign. I was perplexed with part of the opening paragraphs when Mr Bergstrom discusses the positive aspects of the German battle plan and its subsequent execution of it. I fully agree that the German plan and preparation of said plan was generally very good, especially considering the lateness in the war, having been pushed back from Normandy and the shortages of fuel and other materials as well as the lack of training to many of the German soldiers. However the battle plan, at least from my perspective, was not as perfect as the author states in this opening but luckily as the chapter evolves, the author clarifies many of those points of contention, at least with regards to the 6th SS PzA. The comments by the author regarding the questionable execution of the SS Army plan clarified much of my concern for the author's comments but I would also submit the fact that with Hitler giving Dietrich, an officer of questionable command experience, the most powerful army of the three and gave him the worse terrain for armor as a major flaw in the plan. When several divisions were late arriving to their launch point and with the problems with the Heydte airdrop, I submit a major alteration to the original battle plan, especially concerning Elsenborn Ridge, should have been exercised but wasn't. There are a number of other tactical concerns that could be debated but, overall, looking at the overview and summary of results as a whole the chapter is noteworthy. The brief dissussion on small solution vs big solution was interesting, especially the part regarding the serious circumstances the Allies would have found themselves in if the warehouse system in and around Liege had been captured by the Germans."Ardennes 1944-1945" is an awesome effort by Mr Bergstrom and it deserves all the praise that I'm sure it will get. For me it's a must have reference for my library and would suggest to all avid students of the campaign that it be added to their's as well. Highly recommended!

I found this to be a good, very thorough examination of the Ardennes battle and, crucially, the aftermath. Most histories of the Ardennes tend to come up with the usual set-pieces; the siege of Bastogne, the massacre at Malmedy, the intelligence failure and then the gradual reduction of the 'bulge'. I am glad to report, therefore, that the size of this book allows more scope for issues such as 'Nordwind' and - especially - Operation Bodenplatte, the Luftwaffe attack on the airfields that has received so little coverage in mainstream histories. Apart from Bodenplatte the air war part of the Bulge is covered in depth throughout and it shows that the Luftwaffe, far from being a spent force, actually contributed a lot during the battle. I would agree with other reviewers that the bulk of the prose concerns the offensive from the German point of view, but this, for me, is a good thing as I have read many histories with an American slant. If you like photos of the battle then this is the book for you, as it contains many pictures that I had never seen before, not to mention some great artworks that will get tank junkies drooling with pleasure. Lastly, I should stress that this is both the largest and heaviest book I own, and it will not make you popular with the postman when he delivers it.

Excellent book. Finally(!!!) objective view of Ardennes battle, with real nondistorted historical information verified in various sources.

Not as bad re the writing style and pro-german commentary as many of the armchair authors suggest. for the images and background alone it is worth having. Large heavy book with presence and gives a different perspective from many of the other publications.

the book is good to read and contains a load of information and pictures. Highly recommended!

Interesting read very informative