Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition by Flyvbjerg. Bent ( 2003 ) Paperback Paperback

Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition (2003) by Bent Flyvbjerg is a dry but interesting look at how expensive projects are chronically over budget, under utilised and delivered late.The book gives the strong impression that the big budget government and private projects like the Channel Tunnel, the Øresund Bridge and many rail projects are chronically misrepresented in financial modelling that precedes them.Flyvberg and his team have analysed many big public infrastructure projects and have found that 9 out 10 cost more than planned, 9 out of 10 are late and 9 out of 10 are not utilised as much as projected. Roads projects, are, however, quite often used more than expected It’s a terrible record. The record of rail projects is the worst, Average traffic on rail projects was 61% of the forecast level and sometimes as low as 25%.After looking at these projects the authors found that those involved in making plans had lots of pressure put on them to cook forecasts. Essentially the promoters of the projects are dishonest and are either after political gain or are set to build the project and personally benefit with the risk generally taken up by taxpayers.The book suggests a framework for better assessment with a range of forecasts made and investigation of how close the forecasts are to what happens after the fact. They also suggest that private money be solicited and made to take some of the risk. If it can’t be obtained it is a good suggestion that the project was not really viable.It could be argued that the projects that are not viable but that are huge achievements should be undertaken anyway. This is a legitimate point. However, deception in the initial phases should still be reduced as much as possible. Part of the problem is described by the authors as being that projects are sometimes chosen on the basis of who has the most dishonest figures.It’s a really interesting book that anyone who believes in infrastructure deficits and that more public spending in infrastructure is required should definitely read.

Bent is probably the world's leading authority on managing large government capital projects; this is a great short book on the essentials -- and what can go wrong. Highly recommend, particularly for governing board members of "rookie" agencies, those that have never done a major project before. Also very useful for governing boards of non-rookie agencies -- heaven knows that there is no shortage of problems with agencies that have done similar projects before and should know better. While this is writing in common-sense terms that are very accessible by those with no background in these areas, it is also a useful checklist for even experienced professionals in the field.Book shipped quickly enough for my purposes, cost was fine; no problems with vendor or delivery.

Proof that there is absolutely zero management skill out there. Coupled with the political bent on these megaprojects provides an atmosphere which is likely to continue with the terrible results we see. Worst case ever was the H3 freeway on Oahu; something like 17 or 18 times the original estimate. With so much history you would think the process should have improved. Now what was that Einstein adage about doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results. If we had operated this way during the height of the space race, we wouldn't have had enough money in the USA to pay the bill. For shame!!!

Definitely worth reading for decision-makers involved with large- and mega-projects.Likes: inflation-adjusted money amounts, the explicit and dramatic examples.Needs: An update (2003). Conversions into USD, GBP, or EUR would have been nice. In most cases it is unclear how the overspendings and schedule slippages were due to estimation bias vs. scope changes, inflation, financing costs, decision delays, etc. The authors provide excellent guidance, though the advice is repeated too many times in my opinion. There isn't much here about decision policy (i.e., criteria trade-offs) and quantitative methods for modeling and risk assessment.

This is the best source of information I have found about mega-projects.I fully disagree with one of the reviewers who says that the book is negative. On one side, it is true that the book explains the likely reasons for the projects to fail. On the other hand, there is no way to escape from these explanations when you talk about risk. In any case, the authors emphasize the idea that some of the projects are worth the money, however the project goals, cost, and impacts should be evaluated and discussed by all the relevant stakeholders (not just by some of them).The book has also a very good basis of empirical evidence which is the main reason why I rate it with 5 stars.In an ideal world, I would like to see the same analysis extended to any kind of mega-project...

I put this book in the same category at Terry Smith's "Accounting for Growth" which changed the way the world looked at company reporting. Though most of the creative accounting that Terry Smith referred to has been cleaned up the same cannot be said of the tricks and swerves found in Megaprojects and Major Programs. Anyone who is a practitioner on a megaproject probably already knew what was going on but Flyvbjerg and Bruzelius have gone to the trouble of quantifying it and providing us with evidence. The book also takes a long overdue sideswipe at poor quality risk proceesses and makes a good case for much more effective and open project appraisal. So in summary like Accounting for Growth this book dares to cast a light on some very costly and unsavoury practices that society leaders indulge in at our cost and with no comebacks. In a properly functioning democracy it would be acted on by the media and taxpayers to put the brakes on politicians and other grand visionaries who are fond of using other people' money to build monuments to their vanity. Finally, this book introduced me to the theory of "optimism bias" which, I have witnessed at close proximity in IT projects for 25 years without realising what it was. For that alone I am grateful. So, there it is. One of two books that I have read that successfully summed up a subject that truly stinks. Terry Smith cleaned up a mess and built a career on Accounting for Growth. I hope the authors do the same with Megaprojects and Risk.

Excellent Book. Interesting detail: on the inside it says printed by Amazon Poland and on the cover it says printed in the United Kingdom. I couldn't care less where they print it - just a funny detail. Doesn't change the quality of the content.Another, rather interesting details, is that the book has 207 pages of which 57 pages are references - hence only 150 pages are content. This is academically correct writing but still, makes a light book.

Written by one of the leading 'rockstars' of the project management field. Well worth reading for anyone involved directly or indirectly with large projects

Nice

The projects used as examples are dated. But the issues raised are current although the.book could be half the size and make the same points

Very useful book, for planners and academics alike.

Super useful book that backs up my own experience of mining projects (similar profile to infrastructure). Informative and valuable content.

i have worked on several mega projects, and this book was helpful in identifying areas where project risks were not analyzed.

Eye opening. Clearly explains why most projects will overrun and why larger ones will overrun more. Strains of Taleb's Incerto thinking throughout

There are much better papers of the author online. The Book gives no practical solutions for Project Management of Mega Projects

not impressive

Excelente e chegou em bom estado