July, 1914 Paperback – Illustrated, April 29, 2014

McMeekin mentions in his introduction that there are more than 25,000 books on WW1, many of them dealing with the question of "cause" and "responsibility." McMeekin's new book is an important new contribution, which is rare; especially for those of us who do not read foreign languages and are not professional historians. Why is this book better than most of the others that have come out recently (centenary approaching, publishers salivating....)? (1) McMeekin appears to have limited his account to contemporary archival and first-hand sources -- there is none of the annoying (though entertaining) reliance on postwar self-justifying memoirs that so many professional and journalistic historians of the period rely on. (2) McMeekin proceeds by taking the reader through a careful, detailed, almost moment-by-moment chronology; the beginning of wisdom. Following the trail of evidence in 6 or more capital over 40 days is difficult, but it is the beginning of wisdom. (3) McMeekin has a sensible approach to the "Who were the deciders?" question in each capital; he shows you what people did and said, and from that record there emerges a sense as to how events were shaped. To give a few examples -- neither Wilhelm II nor Nicholas II were really "deciders", in the sense, say, of US Presidents today, but they were important; nevertheless, McMeekin recognizes the primacy of the chancellors, ministers and others just below the "sovereign"/head-of-state level. (4) McMeekin recognizes that despite the crowned heads and ostrich plumes on the surface, the great European powers in 1914 were close to modern democratic states in which public opinion mattered -- sometimes for real, sometimes as a screen. (5) Importantly, McMeekin has a finely judged sense of contingency -- yes, there were "deep forces" at work; but some totally contingent events played a large part in how events developed. His discussion of counterfactuals is lively and provocative, but also appropriately restrained and illuminating. (6) There is a brief chapter at the end in which McMeekin offers a kind of summing-up of the "sins" -- he uses that word -- of the Great Powers. This is a tour de force -- persuasive by its very Olympian detachment ("None shall 'scape whipping", was my personal reaction.) ....... And here is perhaps the central aim of McMeekin, to balance out the inevitable hindsight effect of Hitler and World War II. It is easy now, in retrospect, to assume the German government in 1914 was as lawless, aggressive and arrogant as in 1939. But such was not the case. The "German war guilt" thesis does not hold up. It may be that McMeekin slightly overweights Russia's appetite for war. But it must be said, his evidence is there and the "case" he makes that the French egged the Russians on is both somewhat new in popular history (most Anglophone historians are rather pro-French) and convincing. All right, how about the negatives? I can think of only one -- McMeekin is not an especially gifted writer; he is clear (a difficult feat given his task), he has an eye for the telling detail, but his prose is rather flat. Here and there his publisher, perhaps, has encouraged him to engage in popularisms that fall somewhat flat (entitling a chapter "The Last Chance Saloon", for example). That's it. This was a much more satisfying book than Christopher Clark's Sleepwalkers (although the two historians share the same general Germany-isnt'to-blame-for-everything view). (Coda: So what did cause WW1? In a nutshell, I would summarize McMeekin (or what I took from McMeekin) as follows: After years of humiliations, Austria felt she must respond to the Sarajevo outrage; she contemplated a short, local response -- perhaps a brief occupation of Belgrade; she asked Germany whether Germany would support this, and Germany, giving too little thought to consequences but probably with the idea that Austria's move would be localized and contained, gave her only ally support -- unfortunately, support in the form of the famous "blank check"; once Austria sent a humiliating ultimatum to Serbia, Russia seized the opportunity -- or recognized a necessity -- of standing behind her Slav compatriots; France then seized the opportunity of engaging Russia in a two-front war against Germany; Germany diplomacy and strategic thinking was incapable of wiggling out of the resulting situation, as Britain was incapable of wiggling out of its prior soft assurances to France; and so, by the first week in August, Germany, Britain and even Austria (by this time) went into a war none of them wanted, only France and Russia really being happy about the outcome. Of course, no one knew how bad it would be. But McMeekin quotes some evidence suggesting that German leaders -- Wilhelm, Moltke and others -- had the same premonition Yamamoto had at the time of Pearl Harbor; i.e., that whatever the start of the war looked like, they were doomed to defeat. And all along, the story is one of successful deceit (all's fair, etc., but the French and Russians were much better at this than the Germans or British); bluster and war-lust alternating with reality checks and the fear of regime-destruction: and, most of all, unutterably depressing ignorance and incompetence on the part of all the players -- ignorance of what was actually happening (this was a world reliant on the telegram) and incompetence in judging realities, formulating strategic aims and then following through. I will leave to others the obvious parallels to our own time.) (Further coda: McMeekin generously credits Barbara Tuchman, a non-academic historian, as piquing his initial interest in WW! and its causes (although he is not shy in pointing out her mis-dating of an important event). I have always thought we all owe out present lives, literally, in some part to the fact that JFK was (with all his faults on other issues) in charge during the Cuban missile crisis and that he had recently read Tuchman's Guns of August, which argues a crude-but-effective version of the "railroad timetable" theory of WW1 causation; along with his anger at being misled over the Bay of Pigs, this helped teach him to question the rigidities of advice about military matters (I can almost imagine him repeating to the Joint Chiefs the point Wilhelm II made to Moltke when the Kaiser believed that re-directing Germany's attack tothe East rather than to France would keep Britain out of the war, and Moltke mumbled that operational and supply considerations would not permit the change.) McMeekin does not follow a crude version of the railway timetable approach, but gives appropriate weight to the key geopolitical consideration that was perhaps the largest determinant of the war's inevitabilty once the diplomats had made their blunders -- the fact that Russia, due to her enormous size, had to mobilize earlier than anyone else, and that once Russia mobilized, Germany had to, and then.....

Exceptional scholarship and masterfully written. Impossible to put down.

The title informs clearly the potential reader what he/she is about to read.As there are thousands of books on the origins of the First WW,the first question is why select this one.The answer is ,in my opinion,because it is one of the better ones in describing the events and because it is very well written,with literary skill in modern but elegant prose.Also because it is bound to be controversial.The book is a blow by blow account of how,within one month,Europe went from peace and prosperity to a 20 million dead war that became global and turned the rest of the 20th century into the biggest war century of all times.It is also very scholarly with a clear text.The reader should be cautioned that the author is judgmental.He does not consider that the responsibility for starting the war,normally assigned to A-H and Germany by many historians,is an open and shut case.He points the responsibility for this strongly to Russia and France and,I consider,he tilts more than fair to that side.Yet,I consider that,in challenging the prevailing opinion on responsibility for the war,he provides a lot of arguments and food for thought,as certainly the responsibility for this war is not s clear cut case and there are a lot of responsible states,differing only by their degree of guilt.The three main causes of War ,Militarism,Nationalism and Imperialism should taint all European Nations involved,because they transformed by their adoption the 20th century into a powder keg waiting for the spark.The only innocent Nations were Belgium and Luxembourg.I do not expand on this because I stated my views in my review of The Sleepwalkers and this review is about this book.The three profound causes that I mentioned are not adequately covered ,but they are not the stated subject of the book either.The reason,I believe,that the author shifted so much the blame on Russia and France ,is that Russia encouraged through her Representative in Serbia a panslavic confrontational attitude against Austria and indirectly Serbian State terrorism and France because she aligned with Russia for anti German reasons.Also because they prepared both war by timetable like everybody else but Russia mobilized first. This however is not the whole story.Granted that they could equally well abstain on the basis that Serbia was not worth 20 million dead but they were not the cause of the spark.The primary responsibility for the spark is with Serbia,Austria and Germany.The author treats the Kaiser in a softer way than most historians ,putting on the dock instead Bethmann,Berchtold and Conrad as Principals responsible for the war on the Triple Alliance side and underlines the belligerence and inflexibility of Samsonov and Pointcare,absolving to an extend the Tsar and Viviani on the Entente sideThe incompetence of the Statesmen, their political myopia and inability to foresee the consequences of their act to the point of imbecility and their willingness to use brinkmanship to the limit to obtain insignificant aims are excellently and persuasively described.I consider useful to go away from the cliche that all responsibility for this war is on Austria and Germany and be critical about it,but I feel that the author in his effort to do so charges the other side with more responsibility than they deserve.In any case the readers of this sort of books are all thoughtful people and can draw their own conclusions.The debate is endless and over simplifications should be avoided.Already clubs are formed assigning the responsibility to this or that Nation.You can join any of them or start your own.The important matter is that the study of the origins of this war by responsible and intelligent Statesmen saved us a few times from a Nuclear Armageddon during the Cold War.This is the real contribution of books like this one.DVKP.S.To facilitate those who start reading about this war's origins below is a not exhaustive list of some significant works on the subject-The guns of August by Barbara Tuchman(Impressionistic style ,excellent prose,easy to understand)-The origins of the war of 1914 by Luigi Albertini(The Classic )-Political Philosophy and the Great War by G P Crean IV(Broad analysis)-The origins of the First World War by Stephen Van Evera,MIT Political Science Dept(Lists all points of view on responsibility,Neutral)-The Sleepwalkers by C.Clark(An excellent, very deep and profound analysis of the causes and the actors,exceedingly well written,avoids assigning responsibility)-Europe's Last Summer by David Fromkin(Very good Primer for the American Public,Classic conclusions)-The origins of the First World War by William Mulligan(Broad and deep with thematic essays and a new approach as to the inevitability of the war)-The Origins of ww1 edited by R Hamilton and H Herwig(The most recent product of serious Scholarship.It goes as far back as 1815.Ten American and one British author examine the Nations behavior and conclude.No European author)

Well researched and does not fall into the old trap of "blame Germany" but instead looks closely at the actions of all the individuals from the different nations and how what might have been a localized war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary spiraled into the Great War.

The book is well written. The collection of historical facts is informative. The title compliments the book very well. It is a good read.

I have read several of his books and this one seem repetitious.

The background diplomatic activity is rarely if ever discussed, this book clearly lays out the error of so many history books that the war was: a) started by Germany, and b) war was avoidable - the politicians had set their stalls out and nothing was going to stop them following their own agenda’s - the end result was a war where there were no winners, each participant lost both in terms of material economic wealth and wasted lives whilst sowing the seeds for not only the Second World War, but the current Middle East problems. Today’s world is no different, no matter how good our press and TV coverage is, the behind the scenes activities of policticians and diplomats will only be “discovered” after the event, when as usual the damage has be wrought and the various Nations have been devastated be by war or economic embargo. We may stand a better chance of peace if, rather than starting a conflict and sending others to sort it, we locked the same politicians and diplomats in a room and told them to sort it - they may then start to think differently.

This book is a nauseating attempt by the author to absolve Germany and Austria Hungary of any of the supposed "real" responsibility for starting the First World War. In a quite cynical presentation of the facts to suit the author's agenda weight is given to any incident - political, diplomatic or military - in which, by the author's biased commentary, can lay as much of the blame as possible at the door of Russia, France, Serbia and even Britain.At the same time, similar incidents by Germany or Austria Hungary are presented as bumbling incompetence devoid if intent or malice.Not only the countries involved but the personalities at the centre of events have been subjected to revisionism by the author with all the malice, intent and decision making laid at the door's of Sazanov, Istvolsky, Poincare, Pasic, Churchill and even Grey. On the other hand, all the German and Austrian players in the events are portrayed as bumbling incompetents whose moves were all the result of mistakes on their part. Where the author is unable to downplay German or Austrian complicity, the ability to influence events of that personality is downplayed.From reading this book, if the author were to be taken at face value, the responsibility for WWI in descending order would be:-RussiaFranceSerbiaGreat BritainAustria HungaryGermanyLike Ring Of Steel this book seeks to lay as much of the blame for this World War at the hands of the Allies as it can. While blame was certainly not one sided and both sides have culpability the intent of this book seems to be to absolve the Triple Alliance of as much blame as it can. A travesty of a book that should never have seen the light of day.