Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief

James M. McPherson explains that Abraham Lincoln “was a hands-on commander in chief who persisted through a terrible ordeal of defeats and disappointments to final triumph” during the Civil War (8). While Lincoln never experienced combat, military affairs consumed his entire presidency (xv). Thus, Lincoln was not a “natural strategist” because he learned “the functions of commander in chief on the job” but he “worked hard to master this subject” (4). McPherson’s thesis is that although Lincoln’s management of the Union war effort included early setbacks, he learned from his mistakes and guided the Union to victory in the Civil War (267). McPherson combines his extensive research in the Civil War with a straightforward prose. He relies on primary sources, particularly The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln and the Union generals’ private and professional correspondence. McPherson argues that most of Lincoln’s troubles originated with promoting generals who did not employ “concentration in time” that aimed to destroy Confederate forces with coordinated and simultaneous offensives by Union armies (70). To Lincoln’s dismay, few Union generals acted upon that understanding in fear of the enemy or in favor of “concentration in space” that aimed to capture locations and limit casualties by avoiding large-scale battles (70). After frustrating battlefield losses and mounting political pressures, Lincoln demoted incompetent generals in favor of those who would consistently engage the Confederate armies. For example, Lincoln’s appointments of generals Ulysses S. Grant, Philip Sheridan, William T. Sherman, and George Thomas proved effective in coordinating Lincoln’s military strategy. By 1865, these Union generals had defeated the Confederate armies that had the advantage of interior lines and that had proven more aggressive in previous battles (242-256). Although military strategy occupied Lincoln’s mind, he also balanced political divisions among both soldiers and civilians. McPherson claims that Lincoln’s ability to convince both conservative and radical Republicans that emancipating the Confederacy’s slaves was a military necessity to preserve the Union “was a stroke of genius” (129). Lincoln believed that “his war powers as commander in chief” permitted him to recruit “freed slaves into the Union army and navy” (158). As a result of the Emancipation Proclamation, “two hundred thousand black soldiers and sailors” helped the Union to defeat the Confederacy (159). By late 1864, the combination of competent generals willing to execute Lincoln’s military strategy with the increased manpower of black soldiers resulted in military success on the battlefields. These victories united the Union war effort and allowed Lincoln to win reelection in 1864 on a platform that called for absolute victory and the abolition of slavery (242-250). With Union military victory in April 1865, the Union experienced both reunion and abolition. McPherson’s strength is his description of Lincoln’s direct influence throughout the Civil War, including his interest in weapon technologies. For example, Lincoln recommended the use of Spencer’s repeating rifles in Union cavalry raids and provided the initial support to construct ironclads, which both contributed to victories (190-192). Moreover, Lincoln’s Special Order No. 1 resulted in Grant’s victories at Forts Henry and Donelson in the West but also Lincoln’s tense relationship with George B. McClellan in the East (69-83). In fact, McPherson analyzes in great detail Lincoln’s strained relationship with McClellan and other Union generals whom Lincoln either demoted or relieved from command. However, McPherson places much more emphasis on analyzing Lincoln and McClellan’s relationship than he did with any other general. But McPherson’s focus on Lincoln and the generals ignores the soldiers who fought under their command. In addition to providing analysis on the offensive and defensive military strategies, McPherson explains that the Union transitioned from a “soft war” policy that attempted to minimize social changes and casualties to a “hard war” policy that encouraged generals to inflict damages on the home front and encouraged large-scale engagements in order to destroy Confederate forces (103-115). Although McPherson includes Union Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs, he omits the importance that logistics served in efficiently transporting troops and supplies to the battlefront. While McPherson argues that the “Union armies were bogged down by the very abundance of their supplies” he also dismisses the fact that the Union transported these supplies for use in battle (136). He implies that Meigs supplied McClellan’s forces too well and that that had caused McClellan’s delays and slow movements. However, Meigs fulfilled his responsibility to supply the Union armies with supplies to win the war. McPherson organizes his endnotes in a detailed “Notes” section that allows scholars to inspect each of the author’s sources. He includes twenty-four images with short descriptions of each in order to provide the reader with a visual aid and a more humanistic description of the characters. While many Lincoln biographers and Civil War historians have recently focused on cultural and political consequences, McPherson reminds historians that Lincoln’s role as commander in chief occupied most of his time and that historians should appreciate Lincoln’s growth in that position (xv-xvii). Although McPherson omits some information and provides wavering implications on others, he writes a concise and telling account of Lincoln’s success as commander in chief and his central role in achieving Union victory on the battlefields.

Historian James McPherson is justly famous for having written  Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (Oxford History of the United States)  -not only the best single volume book of the US Civil War, but one of the very best books of History on any country at any time. Battle Cry of Freedom offered a unique synthesis of Civil War scholarship in a brilliantly written and meticulously considered book. Since "Battle Cry of Freedom", McPherson has struggled in vain to produce anything as remarkable. His output has varied from reflections on the importance of the Civil War and Abraham Lincoln ( Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution ), to interesting if predictable research into the motives of the Civil Warriors ( For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War ), and even to fairly forgettable accounts of major battlefields ( Hallowed Ground: A Walk at Gettysburg (Crown Journeys) ).In "Tried by War" Lincoln tackles a subject he has highlighted earlier as a gap in Civil War Scholarship: The role of Abraham Lincoln as the Supreme Commander of the Union, and his contribution to the military victory.Under the surface of "Tried by War" hides a fascinating, and to the best of my knowledge untold, story of the political and institutional changes of America. While McPherson at times senses that something is missing his narrative, reflecting on the political reasoning behind the military decisions, for the most part he settles with repeating - sometimes almost verbatim - the main narrative from "Battle Cry of Freedom". That this is nonetheless a readable, entertaining, and at times enlightening read is a great tribute to McPherson's capacities as a storyteller and a - conventional - historian.McPherson's narrative focuses on two main aspects of Lincoln's contribution: His attempt to maintain public support for the War, and his struggles to make his Generals execute his military strategy rather than their own. The rest of my review would focus on the latter issue exclusively.While Historians generally try to explain historical events by analyzing the interactions of complex historical trends and forces, Military history seems to have remained content with describing all history in terms of personalities. "Tried by War" definitely sins in this regard - in the main, it is a description of Lincoln discarding unsuitable Generals (George B. McClellan, Winfield Scott, Joseph Hooker, etc), and promoting the right ones (Chiefly Grant, but also Sheridan, Sherman and Thomas).McPherson points out that Lincoln had a strategic vision of the war which differed greatly from that of his Generals, particularly General McClellan. This alone was not remarkable; Political leaders often have very different views from those of their Military advisors. What was remarkable about Lincoln's strategic insights were that they were obviously superior to those of the military, and that Lincoln managed to get the army to execute them. These accomplishments are all the more remarkable given Lincoln's lack of either military or high-level political experience.Lincoln's proposed Grand Strategy for the War involved the destruction of Confederate Armies; It called upon the Union to take advantage of its superiority of numbers to conduct major military operations simultaneously - what McPherson calls "concentration in time" so as to prevent the Confederates from shifting resources each time against one Union army or the other. The strategy of Lincoln's early Generals was a strategy of a War of movement and encirclement (e.g. Winfield Scott's "Anaconda Plan"), designed to subdue the rebellion without major set battles.As I said, other leaders have disputed the strategies suggested by their generals. But even with hindsight, it is not easy to say who was correct. Hitler's military adventurism seemed deranged to his senior commanders, but was it? After all, Hitler's bold action had paid handsome dividends, as with the invasion of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and of course France ( Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941 ). British Premier Lloyd George wanted the military to change the focus from the deadly Western Front to a sort of military action in the East. While the popular view of the Great War is one of "Lions led by Donkeys", many military historians agree with the military (See  Mud, Blood and Poppycock: This Will Overturn Everything You Thought You Knew about Britain and The First World War (Cassell Military Paperbacks)  and  Forgotten Victory: The First World War - Myths and Realities (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications) ). Even Jefferson Davis had envisioned a military strategy different than the one executed by the Confederacy - one modeled on George Washington's policy of preserving the armed forces and avoiding battle except under positive circumstances (But Confederate strategy was shaped above all by Robert E. Lee - and how many people are willing to consider that Lee erred? -  Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History ).In my opinion, the source of Lincoln's superior military insight comes from political, rather than personal, grounds. The Pre Civil War army was a predominantly Southern, and especially Virginian, institute. The last three Secretaries of War were all Southerners; Its commander, Winfield Scott, a Virginian (albeit a loyal one). Many of its highest and most admired officers were Southerners as well (Primus inter pares, of course, was Robert E. Lee).While I have no information on the Northern officers, I imagine most of them were sympathetic to their Southern colleagues, and thus mostly belonging to the Democratic party (McClellan, Rosecrans, Burnside were all Democrats, although Winfield Scott had been a Whig). The Democratic Party was a political coalition, where the senior partners were the Southern elite. The kind of War Lincoln and the Republicans called for would mean massive destruction of Southern lives and treasure, undermining the power of the Southern Democrats and solidifying Republican control. No wonder Democratic Generals disapproved. This was possibly a source of difference between Lincoln and the Generals: War as the continuation of Party Politics through other means.Also remarkable was Lincoln ability to discard Generals who failed to do his bidding, and to promote those who did. Lloyd George loathed Field Marshall Haig, but was unable to oust him (See  Lloyd George: War Leader, 1916-1918 (Penguin Biography) ). Truman has had great difficulties in retiring General McArthur, and George W. Bush has had to await an electoral defeat before reshaping the Iraqi military strategy around "the Surge".This is another question McPherson does not discuss. I would speculate that the answer is institutional. Unlike the armed forces in other conflicts, the US Army at the war's outbreak was in a state of chaos. Many of its best officers - including the designated commander -defected, and went to fight for the other side. Thus, deprived of key personnel, the army had to expand to numbers approximately 50 times its pre war size, and to prepare for a war more savage than anything it has known. Other expansions of the armed forces relied upon a skeleton of military professional. The army of the Civil War was commanded by soldiers who returned to active service after lucrative careers outside of it (unlike the rebuilding of US Forces in the First and Second World Wars, which were commanded by career officers such as John Pershing and George Marshall). If the President was "green", he faced a military establishment less established, so to speak, than other leaders.None of this is to disparage Lincoln's accomplishment, but only to try and set them in perspective. McPherson doesn't attempt to do this, and thus fails to really tell us much new about the 16th president's generalship."Tried for War" is as well written as one can expect from McPherson (although, unlike his previous books, it contains excessive melodrama: "Has it not been for Lincoln's support at this time, the Grant of history would not have existed - and perhaps neither the Lincoln of history" p. 85). If you take it for what it is - a narrative of Lincoln as commander in chief - it is both adequate and entertaining.

As his victory was confirmed across a divided United States, Abraham Lincoln had little idea of how Civil War would shape every single aspect of his life and presidency. Quite literally from day one, the nation's new 16th President was receiving grave messages regarding the state of the union, and impending doom at Fort Sumpter, which was soon to become the spark behind perhaps the world's most destructive and important civil war. There is not better historian than McPherson to describe this dangerous and revolutionary time in the USA's and arguably, the world's fate.Let me make this clear now, this book is a masterpiece.If you are looking for a simple biography of Lincoln, this is not your book. From page one, you are thrown into Lincoln's dilemma, the dilemma of keeping a country together, while repairing it at the same time. 'Tried by War' focuses mainly on the military decision making behind some of the deadliest conflicts of the Civil War. And it pulls no punches. I do feel that we are often led to see Lincoln as some messiah, who did no wrong, but that simply is not the case. McPherson appropriately depicts Lincoln learning with his generals, making mistakes, trusting the wrong men, watching as his country ripped itself to pieces. But McPherson does this beautifully, reminding us that Lincoln is after all, only human, making the same mistakes we all do.His difference though, is that he persevered and carried on, through poor health, a neglected family and a Union north that often hated him. McPherson shows us in vivid detail that Abraham Lincoln was the literal translation of 'Commander-in-Chief', taking control of military decision making when others simply were not capable. He supplemented this command with rigorous self-teaching of military history and tactics, McPherson reminds us that that Lincoln hit the tactical nail on the head long before Grant ever took overall control, 'We must menace multiple fronts'.The beauty of this book is that it highlights the passion that Lincoln put into the war effort. When McPherson writes of Lincoln haunting the halls of the telegraph office in the early hours, you feel like you're there with the President, contemplating with him. I do feel that many do not realise that the Civil War defined every aspect of his presidency, from his inauguration to his assassination at the hands of Booth. So books like this are needed to diversify the extensive field of Lincoln life academia.If you are looking to learn more about America's greatest president, and one of the world's greatest leaders, you have to read this book. You will not be disappointed.

There are many books about the American Civil War, but James McPherson's 'Tried by War' is the only one I know about Lincoln's role as commander in chief. The gap Mr McPherson fills is important, because Lincoln was the one who effectively defined what the powers granted to the commander in chief in broad outline by the constitution really meant in practice.Lincoln's search for generals capable of winning the war is well known. (It wasn't until I played the USA in Paradox's computer game 'Victoria II' that I really appreciated the problems he had.) One the interesting things that comes out of this book is the way the self-taught Lincoln, who systematically read the military textbooks of the day to educate himself in military affairs, was able to zero in on the importance of destroying the enemy armies. Most of his early generals were fixated on taking territory - especially Richmond.One of the consequences of this was that while Lincoln saw Lee's forays into Union territory as an opportunity cut the Army of Northern Virgina off, envelope it, and destroy it, his generals merely saw it as an opportunity to march in the opposite direction - towards Richmond. Perhaps this is a natural consequence of the fact that in a civil war you know the enemy personally, especially in the higher echelons, who you trained with, and you therefore seek ways to win the war without fighting bloody battles. Unfortunately, such an attitude, while it may be laudable, doesn't win wars.Mr McPherson has written one of the most readable books on any aspect of the Civil War that I have come across, and I can thoroughly recommend it.

This book is too short! I could have carried on reading it forever.This guy is probably the best Civil War historian of his era, and thereare plenty of other great ones! Well researched and a refreshinglydifferent look at Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief. It adds a newdimension to our understanding and is readable enough to appealto even those with casual interest in the subject. Compulsory readingfor Civil War nerds like me!

A must for those interested in american civil war.

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