Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay

I found this Nimitz book well-written and enjoyable. Like the man himself, it deserves my five stars. The author is entitled to speak authoritatively from his emeritus perch at Annapolis; he delivers according to his book’s title. It is refreshing to see an author stake out his territory and stay within his patch. I have several questions, however, after a thorough and enjoyable read.First, Nimitz is famous for his support and considerate treatment of his staff and associates. Just take a look at his backing of Admirals Fletcher, Halsey, Spruance, and, eventually, Mitscher. But Nimitz’s handling of two specific situations puzzles me and strikes me as out of character. This book and others spell out the battle fought between the Naval Intelligence units in Washington and within Nimitz’s Pearl Harbor coterie. The debates swirled around Joseph Rochefort and his prediction to Nimitz and the navy brass that the Japanese were planning to strike at Midway. Washington and Admiral King opposed this conclusion and even after events proved Nimitz and Rochefort correct, Rochefort’s enemies persisted until they succeeded in transferring him out of Pearl Harbor and intelligence work. They also vetoed Nimitz’s recommendations thereby denying Rochefort the decorations which were awarded to those involved in the Midway victory. The plain fact is that Nimitz did not “go the mat” for Rochefort but instead allowed his transfer out of Pearl Harbor and his staff for duty on construction of a floating dry dock! In effect, the hero of Midway was sent to Coventry by the naval hierarchy—including Nimitz. Finally, on President Ronald Regan's “watch”, Rochefort’s family had the satisfaction of his 1986 posthumous award of the Naval Distinguished Service Medal and the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Why did Nimitz defer to Admiral King and Rochefort’s opponents and allow this shabby treatment of Rochefort? The naval victory at Midway was the crown jewel in Admiral Nimitz’s record and one would have thought that he couldn’t have done enough for Rochefort. But he didn’t.The second puzzle involved the illustrious Admiral Spruance, the controversial commander of the victory at Midway. Toward the end of WWII, Congress agreed to create a military position involving five stars—both for the army and navy. Each service was authorized slots for these promotions. The US Army promptly decided to whom it wanted to promote to this pinnacle of its service—and did so {Marshal, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Arnold}. The navy quickly decided on and filled three of its slots {King, Nimitz, and Leahy}, but Nimitz agonized over a remaining slot—should Admiral Halsey or Spruance receive it? Typically, Spruance modestly refused to “campaign” for the promotion while Halsey lusted after it. Halsey had some major demerits on his record which caused Nimitz to delay for over a year on the decision—and justifiably so. In the end, however, the fifth star did go to Halsey after WWII ended and there was feeling among Spruance’s allies that Nimitz counted on Spruance’s self-effacing modesty to not cause any “waves” over the decision. Such was, in fact, the case, and the “squeaky wheel” got the grease. Spruance was a good friend of Nimitz and, in fact, he and Nimitz agreed to be buried in adjacent plots such was their bond. Yet Nimitz failed to “go to the mat” for Spruance, the victor of Midway, and not a few observers and “Monday Morning Quarter Backs” felt Nimitz had taken the easier road in this highly-watched and contentious decision. Spruance ended his naval career with four stars and Halsey with five. It was Nimitz’s “call.”One of the strong points of this book is the author’s ability to skate through the issues with an ability to get at the essence without bogging down in the minutiae of WWII in the Pacific. Not many books on this area succeed or even try this feat. Craig Symons succeeds, in my opinion.One piece of information he presents startled me. During the battle of the Leyte Gulf, Admiral Halsey made several serious blunders and because of communications failures left Nimitz and his associates with misimpressions about his disposition of his ships. At the time, Nimitz was hosting his son, a navy submarine commander on leave, in his headquarters. So Nimitz, Jr. {“Chet”} was witness to the controversial unfolding of the flawed communications {or lack thereof} between his father and Halsey during the battle. The author offers two stunning tidbits based upon Chet’s recollections. First, the son shared his puzzlement as to why his father just didn’t break his policy of non-interference with a battle commander and radio Halsey, asking him where he was and what he was doing. Instead Admiral Nimitz remained silent, everyone in his circle remained in the dark, and Halsey blundered. This reader and legions of historians reviewing what unfolded during the battle share Chet’s puzzlement and wished Admiral Nimitz had queried Halsey. When he finally did, it was largely too late to spare the U.S. Fleet in the Leyte Gulf the damage it suffered and the black mark which accrued to Halsey. Second, Symonds quotes Nimitz, Jr. as blaming the unhappy outcome over Halsey’s blunder on his father—it was his fault the son concludes about his father’s stewardship in this matter. I have never read this anywhere else, and I believe the author might have given the son’s strong assertion a little more airing. The son was onto something here. Did it affect the father and son relationship which was somewhat frosty anyway?This book has completely satisfied my quest for perspective on Admiral Nimitz, and so I felt very rewarded for my endeavor in reading it.

Craig Symonds is one of those rare historians who are accomplished in two separate eras. First is his lengthy string of Civil War books, including Lincoln and his Admirals and a biography of Confederate General Patrick Cleburne, the latter being widely regarded as one of the Confederacy’s best combat generals. Symonds has become perhaps even more widely known for his works on World War II, especially with his books, The Battle of Midway, Neptune, and his masterpiece - World War II at Sea. This deep experience helps to make his latest book, Nimitz at War, an authoritative account.There is another unusual factor at work with this book. As a young professor at the Naval Academy, Symonds had the good fortune to share office space with another Naval Academy professor, Elmer B. “Ned” Potter, who wrote what is still considered the best overall biography of Chester W. Nimitz and who edited a book with Nimitz on naval history that was relied upon in teaching Naval Academy students. Working with, and being friends with, Potter surely gave Symonds insight and a perspective that other historians may not have had.Symonds in his introduction makes clear that this book is not a biography of Nimitz and simply focuses on his war years, with a brief epilogue summarizing Nimitz’s post-war life.There is of course an enormous of ground (or shall we also say “ocean”) to cover. And yet Symonds does so in a brisk but comprehensive manner. The narrative does not contain an ounce of fat and not a single sentence is wasted. Symonds’ many years of writing and teaching serve him well in driving forward the narrative in what is a compelling read.The responsibilities that fell upon Nimitz in conducting the war in the Pacific beggar description. Arriving at Pearl Harbor on Christmas, 1941, Nimitz was faced with a wrecked fleet and an ascendant Japan. His naval assets initially were tiny in comparison to Japan’s. He was also faced with America’s “Germany first” priority that meant his needs received lower priority. Making the best of what he had, Nimitz carefully planned limited offensive actions that provided the “most bang for the buck” until the mighty manufacturing resources of the United States provided him what became the most powerful navy in history that virtually annihilated the Imperial Japanese Navy late in the war.The most intriguing portions of the book center around the numerous relationships Nimitz had with other Naval, Army & Marine commanders, as well as superiors in Washington, D.C. Not surprisingly, a good number of these individuals were arrogant, cantankerous, stubborn, prickly, and/or had difficulty playing well with others. Inter-service rivalries are on full display in this book, which Symonds portrays with perceptive analysis. This book is a master class on Nimitz’s managerial skills displayed in so many ways to sooth egos, select the right man for the particular assignment, promote inter-service harmony, defend subordinates where appropriate, and most importantly, do what was right to advance in the war effort against Japan. Anyone familiar with Douglas MacArthur will recall he scored high on the self-importance scale. The many ways in which Nimitz’s diplomatic skills with MacArthur helped to resolve difficulties are fascinating. Particularly amusing is a quite ribald joke Nimitz told MacArthur that took the tension right out of the room. Let’s just say it is a joke I would not feel comfortable repeating to my parish pastor.Let no one assume that Nimitz could not be firm as a rock when he needed to be or that he could not make hard decisions. While Symonds clearly thinks highly of Nimitz, this book is not a hagiography, however. He points out Nimitz’ mistakes, one example being Peleliu. Symonds also notes that Nimitz, being a product of his time, reflected some social attitudes that would invite censure in today’s contemporary times.For me, an important quality for a top commander is his willingness to visit his troops on the battlefield and mix with the “grunts.” Nimitz frequently did so not only as a morale-raiser but also because he was genuinely concerned about their welfare and opinions. It is also evident that Nimitz wanted to avoid needless bloodbaths, even though in war such events sometimes occur.Symonds directly and indirectly is thoroughly persuasive about the tremendous contributions Chester Nimitz made to the war effort in the Pacific. At a time when history, especially military history, has become de-emphasized and sometimes even scorned, it is important for Americans to remember men like Nimitz who had such a huge role in winning World War II, even if he never pulled a trigger. America owes a very large debt to Chester Nimitz.Craig Symonds has made yet another important contribution to our understanding of the World War II in the Pacific.

Very good book. Provides a good review of the Pacific Theater operations and the difficulties faced by the commanders there. Eurocentric histories of WWII forget the immense distances an associated problems in waging war in the Pacific.

This book is an easy, enjoyable read. Its presentations are lucid and educational, albeit not overly comprehensive. That absence is, I think, intentional as the theme and focus are Admiral Nimitz's leadership style and principles. This book is useful introduction about Limits and the Pacific war. I look forward to reading more about "calculated" risk.I also now understand why so much time passed before Halsey was awarded his fifth star. Reading this book, I do not agree that should have occurred.A measure of the admirals innate decency is the agreement with three colleagues that all four and their wives be buried beside or near each other.Thank you for this book.

It is a new and interesting way to look at the Pacific War. It is well worth the read. Very knowledgeable.

Best book I have read on the Pacific war. Found it by chance on Amazon. Looking for more about individual leaders

A study in leadership in a well written book.