Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World's Oceans Hardcover – June 6, 2017

This book is written for an uninformed audience. Much of the information presented is familiar to anyone who has a basic level of understanding of world history and geography. Most unfortunately, it appears that the author did not employ the services of a professional editor. The phrase "to say the least" punctuates all too many sentences. For example, admiral Stavridis describes his relationship with a former subordinate as "close, to say the least." What does that mean?The book is also littered with disjointed throwaways of questionable academic value, such as the assertion in the context of Munich that "Appeasement failed, as it always does." Always? This particular phrase illustrates the nature of this book; an undisciplined, barely edited pseudo-academic stroll through the woods of world history. Were they to read this book, my professors ar the Naval Postgraduate School would surely feel seasick.Admiral Stavridis injects his personal experiences throughout the book, but these anecdotes strain to add anything to the story. Take for example the account of the Egyptian pilot who nearly ran the then-captain's ship aground. So what? The reader learns not one single additional thing about the Suez Canal. We do learn that if a US Navy captain allows the vessel under his command to bump into something solid, his career is over. What does this have to do with "geopolitics "?If you are a prospective buyer of this book, take the following test before you spend your money. Do you know absolutely nothing about the oceans or geography of the world? Do you like to read autobiographies devoted to self-aggrandizing? Do you think that being a 4-star admiral makes someone an expert in "geopolitics "? If you answered in the affirmative three times, you should buy the book. If you prefer in-depth learning about the world's oceans and their role in history, read the works of Samuel Eliot Morison, who was promoted to flag rank on the strengh of his scholarship.

Q: What is the difference between a fairy tale and a sea story?A:A Fairy tale begins,” Once upon a time…”A sea story begins: No bull! Is was just like this…”TraditionalLarge parts of Admiral and Professor’s James Stavridis’ Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World's Oceans is a combination of sea stories and shallow recitations of history. This history is not just undergraduate level, it may have been gleaned from Naval Academy undergraduate essays. The sea stories may serve to emphasize that he is writing about places he knows firsthand, but that makes this too much of a memoir, that is less than an autobiography. All of that aside some of his analysis is very insightful, important and perhaps necessary.In particular every one of his warnings about China as the dominant, and less than friendly power Across the East, North and South China Seas has proved to be no less than prescient. And in the years since publication, China exhibits no indications of becoming less so. Likewise his warnings about Russia as a slightly less, but carefully growing threat in its many areas of geographic self-interest need to be part of America’s situational awareness. However much we celebrated the “End of History” at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, The Admirable is very clear sighted in sharing with us some of what he learned from being there as various aspects of 2021 geo-politics were manifesting themselves in 2017.Having addressed the major points, there are a few reef points, ( As a USNA graduate he will get the reference.) Adm. Stavridis cannot help but be very conversant with terms like the “littoral”, and “choke points’, but he misses the duty of an educator, particularly when writing to a general audience, to make clear the meaning of the terms and underlining the importance of them.littoral, broadly speaking is that part of a land mass, island or continent, that is suitable for amphibious action. A more technically accurate definition is that the littoral is where the sea comes up to the shore, rather like where the beach comes into the sea. At the time this book was being written the Navy was very concerned with adopting this term in its strategic thinking and in fact new classes of ships were built with this new point of view in mind.At the end of the book, Adm. Stavaridis acknowledges that in choosing the name Sea Power, he was taking up where Professor E B Potter’s standard text book Sea Power had ended. Both The Admiral and I read this book as part of our plebe year Naval History course. He should have more deeply considered why the Potter book was a standard text. What The Admiral might have done better with his book, would have been to give some preference to defining Sea Power, its various concepts and why a general reader will benefit from such knowledge.

Good analysis on the topic of the Sea by breaking it into the segments of our oceans Pacific, Atlantic etc. & including the Arctic & the associated importance of each going back to the beginning of civilizations in the Mediterranean. The final chapter puts everything together in terms of the strategic importance of each & every one of these oceans & the necessity of readiness in the 21 century to be up to task in dealing with potential conflicts with China & Russia on the open sea.

If you can get by the fact that this felt like it was written with the idea of maximizing adjectives to meet a word or character goal, then you might like it if the topic appeals to you. I only read this to see for myself if my son was telling the truth about how “word salady” his summer reading assignment was. He wasn’t lying - it’s a tough read unless you have a neutral curiosity for the subject matter.

And extraordinarily articulate author. Just because I am also a retired naval officer doesn’t alter my view. Well worth reading by anyone who is a critical thinker about history.

Long on history and a valuable insight on how a top ranking admiral views future threats. Also reads like a biography and resume for the author. Excellent book covering the past, present, and future of each of the seven, (eight) seas and all of the nation's that gain power and influence by controlling them.

I would recommend this book to future world leaders concerning the importance of global trade for all of us. Also, holistically we need to work together globally to keep our oceans environmentally safe for future generations. We have no choice in this matter and Admiral Stavridis articulates this requirement to the reader very eloquently in this book. Fantastic read....

Great introduction to naval power from a modern perspective. The author is knowledgeable, authoritative, and interesting. I recommend this book to anyone interested in global history or about to embark on a sea voyage.

I have read the first 75 pages and am giving up on this book. The version of history presented here is superficial and frequently either misleading or wrong. I abandoned my reading because my spidey-sense was constantly jangling but as justification I know I need to give concrete examples of author error even if they are mere islands in a ocean of crassness.Of the American 'opening' of Japan: "He [Commodore Perry] sailed into Tokyo Bay in July 1853 with the intent to communicate using what we would think of today as a 'soft power' approach - sensitivity to culture, avoiding a resort to military force, using economic and diplomatic levers as a first choice, and laying out a compelling geopolitical case to other actors." Horse doo-da! Placing a squadron of warships off the Japanese capital, declining to leave when asked, issuing threats of violence and training your guns on Japanese targets, as happened though unmentioned by the author, are gunboat diplomacy if not simply acts of war. What they are not is soft power or the use of economic levers.In speaking of the end of World War II: "Sadly, conflict would not disappear from the region [the Pacific rim] as the Korean War would break out several years after the end of World War II, and of course the U.S. war [!] in Vietnam would follow just over a decade later." Is he unaware of the Chinese civil war? What about the conflicts in the former French, British and Dutch colonies that lead to the creation of Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia as independent nations? Do wars not count in the absence of US boots on the ground?Another piece of nonsense: "In the 1600s, there were three wars between the English and the Dutch, which did not turn out well for the Hollanders ..." While it is certainly preferable not to have wars, as a gloss this is ludicrous ... the Dutch did fine in the first, second and third Anglo-Dutch wars, the English less so. Further in 1688, there began a fourth conflict which ended with James II a guest of the French. Not only were the resources of his Kingdoms (England, Scotland and Ireland) unavailable to support James' ally Louis XIV but they were in the hands of Louis' enemy, the Dutch Stadtholder, William of Orange (William III) which was considerably to the advantage of the Dutch.In addition to the 'history' which seems to have been stuff Americans learn about their own country in school augmented by half-remembered scraps from the backs of cereal packets to cover the rest of the World, there was a goodly portion of the author's own remiscences about his time at sea. Maybe in the hands of a better writer this could have been interesting but as it was I found it off-topic and dull as dishwater to boot.

This book is short in fact and long on the opinion of the author. As the title itself claims to be of the history and geopolitics of sea power, there is a gap between the description and content from the cover on.1. China did not focus internally for five hundred years as suggested in the chapter concerning the South China Sea.2. The occupation and buildup of the Hawaiian Islands did not “vault the United States into power in the Pacific.” It was the purchase and following conquest of the Philippines Islands that led the US to build a Pacific fleet of sizeable proportions, and the launching of vessels such as the Tennessee that made the US a naval force (Andrew Lambert among other scholars states the US is not a maritime power).While the anecdotes and personal stories may be an attempt to personalise the book, they appear forced, and should perhaps have been omitted from a book that claims to be “a powerful reckoning with this vital subject.”

Admiral Stavridis's book, "Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World's Oceans", is a book well crafted piece of work. It is excellent in its delivery of understanding the role the sea in shaping world affairs from beginnings of men voyaging on open waters to today with naval forces able to project power across the globe.The author coming from a military background, and being NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander, has skills of demonstrating how the oceans have become critical in the shaping of 21st century geopolitics.The book helps in bring what might be dry subject alive, linking naval history into relevance of today and beyond.This volume of work is a must for anyone with a keen interest in history and current affairs.

Excellent for general information. This is a very good beginning for further study in the strategic importance of our oceans. It is easy to forget how important oceanic activity is when most of us focus on land and air power. I am sure Admiral Stavridis has so much more to say to the uninitiated student of sea power. I regret not being able to attend his lectures. He writes very well, and I look forward to reading more of his books.

Seit Monaten diskutieren Experten und Marineoffiziere in der westlichen Welt die Notwendigkeit zur Rückkehr zu den klassischen Marineoperationen wie Überwasserkrieg, Unterwasserkrieg, Minenkrieg, Seekrieg aus der Luft, aber auch Informationskrieg, Cyberkrieg und Elektronische Kriegführung. Dinge, die in den letzten Dekaden beinahe in Vergessenheit geraten sind und von Piraterie Bekämpfung, Rettung von Flüchtlingen aus Seenot oder Hilfe bei Umweltkatastrophen verdrängt wurden. Mit den klassischen Operationen kommen auch wieder Begriffe wie Sea Control und Sea Denial und Wege zu deren Umsetzung zurück in eine in Deutschland kaum stattfindende Diskussion.Das im Juni 2017 erschienene Buch von James Stavridis „Sea Power. The History and Geopolitics of the World's Oceans“ kommt daher nicht nur zeitgerecht, sondern vor allem sachgerecht, gilt es doch die heutige Ausübung von Seemacht in ihrer ozeanweiten und geschichtlichen Bedeutung zu analysieren und dringend notwendige Erkenntnisse für heutiges und künftiges politisches, gesellschaftliches und militärisches Handeln abzuleiten. Der ehemalige Vier Sterne Admiral, den Älteren noch als einziger maritimer SACEUR bekannt, verknüpft persönliche, geschichtliche und geopolitische Erkenntnisse aus Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft nicht nur im taktischen und operativen sondern auch im politischen und strategischen Bereich. Dabei kommt ihm auch seine jetzige Tätigkeit als Dekan der „Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy“ an der Tufts Universität in Boston zu Gute.In seinem Einführungskapitel „The Sea is One“ verdeutlicht er den globalen Ansatz maritimen Denkens, der alle Ozeane und Meere zu einem Ganzen verknüpft, das der gesamten Menschheit gehört (Global Common). Daran schließen sich Kapitel zum Pazifik, Atlantik, Indik, Mittelmeer, dem Südchinesischen Meer, der Karibik und der Arktis an. Die Entstehung und Bedeutung von Kriegsflotten zur Durchsetzung staatlicher Interessen werden in ihrem anfänglich regionalen Erscheinungsbild – zum Beispiel Mittelmeer – und ihrem später globalen Auftreten analysiert, wobei es angesichts der aktuellen Diskussion über die maritimen Herausforderungen in der Ostsee auffällig ist, dass er als ehemaliger SACEUR mit keinem Wort darauf eingeht. Dies mag auch dem Umstand geschuldet sein, dass er zwar die alleinige Berufung auf Mahan in den strategischen Überlegungen der U.S. Navy kritisiert, selber aber weder auf Corbett und Castex noch auf Geoffrey Till und seine Ausführungen zur Seemacht im 21. Jahrhundert eingeht.Besonders erwähnenswert erscheint sein Kapitel „The Outlaw Sea: Oceans as Crime Scenes“, bei dem Stavridis auf das wiederkehrende Phänomen der Piraterie, organisierte Kriminalität über Drogenschmuggel und Menschenhandel, die Überfischung der Meere, deren Belastung über giftige Abfälle sowie Umweltgefahren durch den Klimawandel eingeht. Er fordert hierbei, nicht nur weltweite Abkommen zu schließen sondern vor allem ein weltweites, internationales Management zu deren Bekämpfung mit einer wachsenden Zahl gleichgesinnter Staaten.In seinem Schlusskapitel „America and the Oceans. A Naval Strategy for the Twenty-First Century“ fasst Stavridis seine Erkenntnisse und Schlussfolgerungen aus den vorangegangenen Kapiteln im Sinne einer Naval Strategy zusammen. Da er neben der erforderlichen Weiterentwicklung von Kriegsmarinen und im Besonderen der U.S. Navy nicht nur die maritime Wirtschaft, sondern auch weltweiten Handel und dessen Schutz wie auch weltweite Vernetzung über unterseeische Glasfaserkabel anspricht, über die mehr als 80 Prozent des globalen Informationsflusses gehen (und nicht über Kommunikationssatelliten), greift die Bezeichnung Naval zu kurz, eine maritime Strategie trifft die Erfordernisse eher.Bevor er zur Fragestellung kommt, was Mahan in seiner Zeit noch nicht wissen konnte, was aber im heutigen und künftigen maritimen Kontext dringend erforderlich sei, zitiert er eine Anekdote zu Mahan, die Stavridis selber betrifft. Mahans Wünsche zu lesen, zu denken, zu schreiben und zu publizieren riefen das Missfallen seiner Vorgesetzten hervor und führten unter anderem zu folgender Aussage in einer Beurteilung: „Es ist nicht die Aufgabe eines Marineoffiziers Bücher zu schreiben“! Sodann geht Stavridis auf einige Lehren Mahans ein, die für die USA und ihre Marine zeitlos bedeutsam sind. Hierzu zählen: Akzeptanz des Staates und seiner Gesellschaft als maritime Nation; eine machtvolle Marine und leistungsfähige Werften; eine große Fischindustrie; leistungsfähige Häfen mit guter Infrastruktur; Eisbrecher für die Arktis sowie die Fähigkeit zur großräumigen Seeraumüberwachung in den eigenen Küstenvorfeldern. Weiterhin gelten die Freiheit der Hohen See für alle; starke Allianzen sowie mögliche Abstützung auf weltweite Stützpunkte und Versorgungseinrichtungen.Was konnte Mahan aus Sicht von Stavridis nicht wissen? Hierzu zählt er als wichtigste die Bedeutung der Unterwasser Kriegführung. Ein Blick in die Schriften des französischen Admirals Castex zu Beginn der 1930er Jahre hätte gezeigt, dass dieser die künftige Bedeutung von U-Booten und Flugzeugen für die Seekriegführung bereits analysiert hatte. Als nächstes erst im 21. Jahrhundert erkennbar eine Joint Kriegführung und der große Einfluss des Cyber Raumes. Dazu kommen die gewachsene und weiter anwachsende Bedeutung des Weltraums mit seinen Satelliten und Raumstationen sowie die stürmische Entwicklung unbemannter Systeme für Unterwasser-, Überwasser- und Luftkriegführung.Diese Erkenntnisse bündelt er zu einer maritimen Strategie, die eine weitere Anpassung der bisherigen bedingt.Zusammenfassend: ein sehr gelungenes Buch über die heutige und künftige Bedeutung von Seemacht, der notwendigen Anpassung von taktischen wie operativen Verfahren und der internationalen Zusammenarbeit Gleichgesinnter. Ein Buch für Politiker, maritime Experten wie auch Marineoffiziere weltweit.