Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Exzellentes Buch, das die Konsequenzen aus der mittlerweile für Jedermann deutliche Überdehnung des US-amerikanischen Empires beschreibt. Ca. 7.000 Stützpunkte weiltweit! Und das Auslandspersonal möchte darin nicht nur so einfach leben, sondern GUT leben. Das kostet! Dies betrifft auch Konsequenzen für EU-Haushalte, die dort als free riders in Sachen Verteidigung bezeichnet werden. Damit zusammen hängen auch Auftritte von Herrn Gauck und Frau von der Leyen, die beide die Erhöhung des Verteidigungshaushaltes der BRD fordern/empfehlen. Meinem Eindruck nach ist diese Cornell-Studie schon länger "in Kraft". Ebenso wie die US-Außenpolitik lange Zeit der Doktrin von Brzinski (1997) folgte, tendiert sie nun seit ca. 9 Monaten eher zu dieser Studie über Restraint, ohne dies allerdings publik zu machen. Es wird darin der Rat formuliert, den Wechsel nicht zu fix zu vollziehen, weil sonst die Glaubwürdigkeit der USA sinken würde. Mag sein, dass dies Herrn Poroschenko in Kiev betrifft, aber sicher auch Taiwan und andere Orte, wo die USA (nicht nur) aus Haushaltsgründen zukünftig weniger involviert sein werden. Man soll sich nicht überall unbeliebt machen. Ein vernünftiger Rat, denn der einzelne Amerikaner ist in der Regel ja ein netter Buddy und hat die gegenwärtige Unbeliebtheit eigentlich nicht persönlich verdient. Ein vernünftiges Buch, ein vernünftiger Ratgeber für Obama. Man weiß allerdings wirklich nicht, in wie weit sein gegenwärtiges Kriegstenor gegen Putin, mit der kleinen Terz von Frau Merkel darüber, wirklich nur Ablenkung von einer Großen Wende (US-Perestroika?) darstellt, oder ob das ernst gemeint ist. Die alte Garde um Albright, McCain, Biden, Kornblum und andere dürften aber ehrlich verärgert sein, denn deren Aufstieg war mit irgendeinem Restraint nicht verbunden. Eher mit dem Gegenteil. Jeder Autofahrer weiß, dass Rückwärtsfahren die Hohe Schule ist, speziell dann, wenn man hinten mehrere Anhänger dran hat. Gorbachov und Jelzin wissen das und haben die Anhänger vorher abgekoppelt, bevor sie die Kupplung losliessen, aber dennoch viele Trümmer hinterlassen, die Putin jetzt wieder (mit der Kalashnikov?) zusammennähen will. Obama wird den Wandel der US-Rolle in einer zunehmend multi-polaren Welt hoffentlich besser hinbekommen. Die Studie Restraint von Barry R. Posen wäre/ist dabei eine gute Hilfe.

Very serious as is a good a teacher's lesson. I learn a lot and the book helps me understand some of the political changes which take place Under the Obama's administration.

The thesis of this book is that the United States is overstretched. The country is spending more than they can afford on defense. We are currently protecting countries which would be better off protecting themselves. We could defend our national interests with less of an outlay. In fact, reducing our presence elsewhere in the world would reduce the level of antagonism against America.Posen's focus is on conventional military power and conventional strategy and tactics – warfare between states. His assumption is that the tools and tactics of the existing military will be appropriate to combat the threats he sees, but it is a question of balance.Posen would like to see more military strength focused on "the commons," the oceans, skies, space and the communications sphere, and less on land-based armies. The United States' greatest assets are its geographic location, isolated, with access to two oceans, and its technology. It should exploit those.This book anticipates non-state aggression such as that we are observing today (June 2014) in Iraq. While he proposes countermeasures, he does not anticipate that this will be the major form of threat to be countered.More significant, Posen did not anticipate the ‘hybrid war' being waged in Ukraine. What is special about it is that the new technologies are being used simultaneously, combining hard and soft power. It is a war of information, disinformation and propaganda; of intelligence and counter-intelligence; cyber warfare; use of highly trained commandos, "green men" with no insignia; use of the non-government actors, including business, NGOs, religious organizations, criminals, and private persons; state use of terrorist)tactics using women and children as human shields in attacks on military and civil objects; energy warfare; economic warfare; corruption to compromise the loyalty of the political and military leadership. It involves the use of bloggers – some might even comment on this review!This hybrid war is designed to frustrate conventional countermeasures. So far it has enjoyed the "blitzkrieg" factor, the advantage that new and unconventional tactics always enjoy for at least a while.Posen introduces two concepts that I find very useful. Cheap riders, similar to free riders, enjoy the benefits of American defense protection without paying the costs. Germany and Japan had this list, although it includes most of Europe. Reckless drivers are countries that take advantage of the immunity provided by American defense guarantees in order to provoke enemies in ways they should not. Chief among these is Israel, although others such as the Georgia could be named.Posen talks about Liberal hegemony, the world order which emerged after World War II. The United States is the leader of this hegemony, supported by the vast number of supposedly democratic states which depend on the United States for protection and trade relations, and which to some extent or another share in the modern Western culture.In Posen's words "Despite some important disagreements among its proponents, it is liberal because it aims to defend and promote a range of values associated with Western society in general and U.S. society in particular— including democratic governance within nation-states, individual rights, free markets, a free press, and the rule of law. The spread of these values is not only seen to be good in its own terms, it is seen to be positive, if not essential, for U.S. security."The United States has worked to expand its Liberal hegemony, attempting to change the fundamental nature of other countries to make them more like itself. This has been a clear failure in the Middle East. The rich countries of the Far East still retain their Confucian or Buddhist character, including their own inscrutable and undemocratic power structures, despite American attempts to impose Western liberalism via constitutions and the so on.In doing so the United States has put a lot of pressure on Russia, Iran, China and other players. Their hostility is in American long-term interests. Dealing with that results in short-term costs.Posen would recommend that we be content to leave people the way they are.Posen's assessment of the United States and the West in general is guardedly optimistic. He talks about how the crisis of 2008 could easily have provoked a widespread depression, but appears sanguine that the problems are in hand, not merely postponed. He does not mention the underlying causes, which appear to have only worsened: the demographics of the labor force and dependent populations; levels of national debt; the inability to balance national budgets; the growing disparity between educational attainment and ability on one hand, and labor market needs on the other.The book assumes – it has to assume as a baseline – that the United States loses its relative financial power only gradually. The book could not factor in "black swan" events, although simply given its breadth and time horizon supposedly unpredictable events seem more likely than not. He is content to note –give him credit, as a man of the center for being this brave, that:" It is difficult to tell whether the anemic growth, high unemployment, eroding middle class living standards, deteriorating infrastructure, and fiscal imbalances presently plaguing the United States are transitory difficulties or represent some deeper set of structural problems that will continue to erode our economic vitality, and hence our power."Posen is right to say that America is wrong to project its almost uniquely sectarian culture onto the rest of the world, remaining blind to the fact that"National identities often integrate within them ethnic and religious roots but nationalism is a modern idea. It holds that a group, united by language, history, and culture, should be protected by the power of a state that it controls"He writes that "" Liberal Hegemony cannot rest on its laurels. It is inherently expansionist and seems destined to drift regularly into military action." Though Posen does not say as much, this bias towards action is certainly influenced by the political structure of America. Eisenhower's military-industrial complex remains a powerful player. He does mention Israel's disproportionate influence on American policy making.His conclusion is a very accurate summary of the book:"In this book I have explained why Liberal Hegemony has not worked particularly well. The strategy has precipitated some balancing by other nation-states and will likely precipitate more as the relative power advantage enjoyed by the United States wanes, and others feel more capable of tilting against the United States. The strategy has made the United States the center of political attention in a world undergoing rapid social, political, and economic change. The United States is sufficiently strong and omnipresent to be blamed by the losers but not strong enough to do much affirmatively to alleviate the stresses and strains that rapid development often causes. The strategy underrates the enduring power of nationalism and the inclination of self-aware peoples to resist direction by outsiders. And the strategy overlooks the extent to which the capacity for organized violence has diffused, rendering even relatively small counterinsurgency efforts hugely expensive. Finally, the strategy leads directly to the issuance of blank security checks to U.S. allies. Some cash the check for increased welfare spending in their own societies, as do the European allies and Japan; they cheap ride. Others cash the check to pay for their own extravagant security adventures; clients as different at Afghanistan and Israel drive recklessly. For all these reasons, Liberal Hegemony has proven an expensive and counterproductive grand strategy."

Barry Posen first explains to his readers that the grand strategy, i.e., a nation-state’s theory about mainly how to address possible external threats to its power position, that the United States of America has built and pursued since WWII, is both hegemonic and liberal. The strategy is hegemonic because the U.S. aims to overwhelm potential challengers so that they will not even try to compete, much less fight. The strategy is also liberal because it aims to defend and promote a range of western / U.S. values, mainly democratic governance within nation-states, individual rights, free markets, a free press, and the rule of law. In 2011, the U.S. was spending 4.8% of its GDP on defense.Mr. Posen argues that the consensus grand strategy that he dubs Liberal Hegemony is costly, wasteful, and self-defeating for the following reasons:1) The U.S. is causing countervailing behavior. Think for instance about China, Russia, and the rogue states.2) The U.S. is also encouraging “cheap ride,” e.g. Europe and Japan, or “reckless drive,” i.e. hurting U.S. interests, or even their own, e.g. Israel and Iraq.3) The U.S. is perceived as insufficiently sensitive to identity politics. Think for example about Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.The author makes the case for a grand strategy of Restraint that is different from both Liberal Hegemony, which is most concerned about opportunities forgone, and Realism, which is most concerned about costs and risks incurred.The grand strategy of Restraint calls for the following integrated reforms which should be implemented gradually:1) The U.S. needs real allies, not the security dependencies it has now in Europe and Asia. These states are wealthy enough to defend themselves or to make much greater contributions to their own security.2) In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. can defend the flow of oil from the gulf and defend Gulf States from one another. However, the U.S. should not maintain military power to intervene in the internal politics of these countries. Think for example about Iraq in 2014.3) The U.S. should reduce, if not eliminate its military subsidies to Israel. At the same time, the U.S. should sell Israel the weapons it needs to remain secure in its bad neighborhood, while distancing itself from the occupation.4) In South Asia, the U.S. should move toward the lowest possible commitment of military force to the region consistent with keeping nihilist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State on the defensive.5) The U.S. must reconcile itself to slowing down nuclear proliferation, rather than its prevention. The key to U.S. security in a nuclear armed world is a potent secure retaliatory capacity backed by an intelligence and warning system for tracking the source of any nuclear attack on the U.S. The country also needs contingency plans for stolen or lost nuclear weapons that could fall into the hands of violent non-state actors. Mr. Posen doubts that preventive war against potential new nuclear powers is likely to be a sustainable answer.The grand strategy of Restraint is best served by a “maritime” military strategy and force structure that does not require over 2.5% of GDP, barring a major increase in global tensions, to support it.Mr. Posen bases its 2.5% estimate on three arguments:1) As mentioned above, there are a limited number of interests that truly matter to U.S. security.2) Picking a ceiling imposes discipline on one’s choices.3) This limit responds to concerns about the long-term fiscal health of the U.S.The maritime military strategy relies on the U.S. command of the commons – naval, air, and space superiority. Under the author’s grand strategy, most active duty troops regularly stationed abroad would be withdrawn and demobilized. Mr. Posen also pleads for the significant reduction of the U.S. overseas base structure and the reorganization of much of what it keeps. In addition, the author pushes for a reduction of the training efforts and exercises with the military forces of other countries. Mr. Posen is here at his weakest because he does not deal thoroughly with the economic and social consequences of his grand strategy for the impacted service men / women, civilians as well as their families.To his credit, the author reviews the Liberal Hegemony and Realist critiques of the grand strategy of Restraint. Supporters of Liberal Hegemony believe that Restraint cannot work because the U.S. has to systematically take the lead to reform international politics in the current “unipolar moment.” Realists also believe that Restraint cannot work because the absence of a world government forces nation-states to look out for themselves.Mr. Posen is well aware that the grand strategy of Liberal Hegemony will not be easily abandoned. The author sees three possible paths to the adoption of his grand strategy:1) The least likely is that politicians will decide to adopt Restraint imminently based on its merits.2) A second path to reform would arise from a major crisis.3) The most likely is that the U.S. will reform the consensus grand strategy gradually, reflecting the modus operandi of modern pluralist democracies.In summary, Mr. Posen invites a necessary debate about the extent to which the U.S. has to engage the rest of the world to preserve its interests and those of its allies.

“Restraint” is a much needed examination of U.S. Grand Strategy (or lack there of) that falls under what author Barry Posen concisely categorizes as “Liberal Hegemony.” Posen argues that since the end of the Cold War (1989), the U.S. has followed an ill-defined strategy of trying to promote Democracy and rational behavior among nation states largely through the use of various degrees of military force under wildly different circumstances. He further argues that this strategy is based on unrealistic assumptions and a poor understanding of U.S. National Interests. Posen offers an alternative Grand Strategy, which he labels “Restraint” which he would base on a realistic appraisal of how to actually achieve effective security for the U.S. and the international community.A good piece of work, but not without its flaws. In his final chapter, “Command of the Commons” very properly develops an outline of the military force structure that a strategy of restraint would require, but I think misses several points. First, as he alludes to, the “commons” was first coined by Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (USN) to refer to the oceans and waterways of the world, which were essential to all international commerce moved. Yet another U.S. Navy Admiral, the late Arthur Cebrowski argued that over this sea commons, in the 21st Century, there is a second commons in the form of the Global (Telecommunications) Network that is equally vital to international commerce. Posen ignores this commons although given his goals, the U.S. should be able to command the Global Network Commons as well. Also, Posen gives short shrift to the unmistakable fact that with globalization individual nation states are increasingly economically, culturally and socially inter-connected. One would think any Grand Strategy would do well to take this into account.