A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam Paperback – Illustrated, 10 April 2007

Lewis Sorley’s brilliant work on the Vietnam War does much to try to correct the imbalance in coverage that most accounts fall prey to. Dr Sorley focuses on 1968 onwards and the huge changes in strategy and tactics that General Creighton Abrams oversaw. Abrams emerges as perhaps one of the greatest leaders America has produced, accomplishing a huge amount despite ever-greater constraints from Washington. It’s detailed, fascinating and surprising in equal measure.

(When) "Creighton Abrams assumed command in Vietnam in early June, (1968). . . The tactics changed within fifteen minutes. . .," stated General Fred Weyand, Commander of the II Field Force. Lewis Sorley details the changes made by Gen. Creighton Abrams as Commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam and asserts we won the war with them, only to have Congress throw it away. He backs his assertions with detailed, well researched and effectively presented data. The question remains, is he right?Under Abrams, U.S tactics changed from large unit, "search and destroy" operations to "pacification" missions designed to protect the South Vietnamese from attacks by the North. Other changes included relying on intelligence to locate the enemy and then aggressively attacking them with U.S. and South Vietnamese troops. This required effective training of our South Vietnamese allies which Sorley says was accomplished for the first time. He implies that had these tactics been employed earlier American support for the war would not have been squandered chasing ghosts through the jungle. In short, we would have won!Sorley says Congress abandoned a South Vietnamese Army fully capable of defending itself had it not been forced to fight a "poor man's war" when promised aid was denied. He is supported by such experts as John Paul Vann (A Bright and Shining Lie, (Niel Sheehan, Random House, 1988) and Henry Kissinger (Years of Renewal, Simon and Schuster, 1999). If they are right, the United States Congress is responsible for the Communist victory in South Vietnam. However, Kissinger points out in his book, "Diplomacy" (Simon and Schuster, 1994) that "prolonged stalemate will sap the endurance and hence the will of the America public." After more than a decade of war large segments of American society had long since abandoned the effort. Does this absolve Congressional leaders? Are these, wait-them-out tactics a blueprint for future U.S. defeats? You decide!This highly controversial and provocative work is sure to bolster the Vietnam era "hawks" who pushed for a military victory and infuriate the "doves" who saw the only "honor" in Vietnam was in our unilateral withdrawal. No matter what side you were on, you owe it to yourself to read this work. It has tremendous implications for our current situation in Iraq and future situations that may arise.

Sorley's book is a landmark work on the 1968-1975 part of the Vietnam War, which is often forgotten. Most books focus on the events immediately leading up to the war, or more often on the 1965-1968 period, from the first US troops to the Têt Offensive. He covers the events mainly beginning with General Abrams' time as commander of the MACV from mid-1968 to 1972. He portrays Westmoreland as thoroughly incompetent, and idolizes Abrams as a genius commander who revolutionized the way the US wage the war. The reality was more complex, as authors Gregory Daddis (who wrote a book defending Westmoreland) and Mark Moyar (who is perhaps the best author on the war). The rest of the book was fine though and talked about late-war pacification efforts, the US withdrawal, incursions in Cambodia, building up the ARVN, Operation Lam Son 719, the Easter Offensive, peace negociations in Paris, and the downfall of South Vietnam.

I finished reading "A Better War" by Lewis Sorley - it is subtitled "the unexamined victories and final tragedy of America's last years in Vietnam".I have been searching for answers to some of the questions that have bothered me for over 30 years: how could we win the battles and lose the war? what was the real impact of our strategies on the enemy? what are the lessons for Iraq?This book really hits home - it provides an answer to part of the puzzle. It does this by describing the enormous differences in approach to the war by General Westmoreland and General Abrams. Abrams assumed command of MACV right after Tet '68 - a time when public support for the war had come undone. Some of you may be too young to remember, but I remember it all too well. We had massive demonstrations in the streets of our cities, troops deployed to Wash DC, bombings on college campuses, and hippies who delighted in spitting on our troops. Everything was falling apart. Yet, Abrams somehow managed, with great dignity and integrity, to effectively fight the war in Vietnam despite the intense distractions back home. He recognized that security of the population was the real objective, and that the war could not be won through a strategy of attrition (a strategy which had totally misread the will of the enemy). And so he completely changed the course of the war.Of course, we know how that movie ended....the war was lost politically despite the new strategy and the victories on the battlefield. And we abandoned an entire people and an ally to their fate. And now we are witnessing a replay of the same script in Iraq.One of the most telling parts of the book is in the Epilogue. Long after the war ended and Abrams had died, his son was on the faculty at the Army C+GS College where someone approached him and said that his father "deserved a better war". His son responded at once, " He didn't see it that way. He thought the Vietnamese were worth it." .

very interesting subject