The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia

The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia by Andrei Lankov was written in 2013, two years after the Supreme Leader Marshal Kim Jong Un succeeded his late father, the Dear Leader Comrade General Kim Jong Il. Lankov was a Soviet-era exchange student who studied in Pyongyang and his fluency in Korean endeared him to his teachers and gave him access to the North Korean public. This book was unlike other modern accounts of the DPRK which I have read, in that it painted thoroughly dismal portraits of the future of the North after the inevitable downfall of its totalitarian system of government. I have read--and reviewed--quite a lot about the DPRK already, yet no book went as far in its detailed scenarios about the state of the northern half of the Korean peninsula after the Kim regime collapses. Yet before we get to the future of the DPRK, we have to deal with its past and present, and Lankov kept his history confined to the first chapter. The author thankfully did not bore me to sleep with his Korean War history, as I am prone to doze off when I read war stories. Thus I confess a personal prejudice for war histories in general.Kim Jong Un inherited a country that is worse off that at any time since the Korean War. The DPRK continues to struggle as a nation punished by sanctions and does not want to see another famine. What can it do to feed its population if its economy cannot provide? The answer, surprisingly, seems to be by not reforming its economy:"Unfortunately for the common North Koreans, the Pyongyang leaders' unwillingness to emulate China has very rational explanations. North Korean leaders stubbornly resist reform not because they are ideological zealots who blindly believe in the prescriptions of the Juche Idea (they do not, and the idea itself is too nebulous to be a guide to a practical policy anyway) nor because they are ignorant of the outside world. They are neither irrational nor ideological--on the contrary, they are rational to the extreme, being, perhaps, the most perfect bunch of Machiavellians currently in operation. The North Korean leaders do not want reforms because they realize that in the specific conditions produced by the division of their country, such reforms are potentially destabilizing and, if judged from the ruling elite's point of view, constitute the surest way of political (and, perhaps, physical) suicide."Lankov asserts that any reforms would trigger the end of the Kim regime. Once the population tastes reform, it will demand more. The North Korean elite fears an Arab Spring or a Ceaușescu-style purge if reforms are introduced, therefore no one is willing to implement any kind of change out of fear of losing one's elite privileges. Without a new economy, the North is left on its own, and can only get attention by stirring up trouble. And the DPRK has perfected the art of rocking the boat by blackmailing its enemies and even its few allies:"Indeed, from the North Korean point of view, it did not merely confirm that blackmail works, but rather confirmed that blackmail works wonders. One could hardly find a better confirmation of the efficiency of Pyongyang's usual tactics--first make a crisis, then escalate tensions, and finally extract payments and concessions for the restoration of the status quo."The North Korean tactic of issuing nuclear threats then reaping the rewards--all on its own terms--has led some diplomats to say enough is enough. They are calling North Korea's bluff, knowing full well that the North will never launch a nuclear missile against the South or any of the ROK's western allies. To do so would be an act of suicide. The strategy of leaving North Korea alone, letting it rant to an empty room, is new, yet has not proven to be entirely effective, as the North has perfected the art of getting whatever it wants regardless of international pressures. It is much like trying to say no to wailing baby:"The North Korean regime is thus not going to respond to either pressure or rewards, and this is increasingly obvious to the interested parties. There is therefore a great--and growing--temptation to say that North Korea is better to be forgotten and safely left alone. This is the essence of the 'strategic patience' strategy, which has quietly become the mainstream thinking of the US foreign policy establishment after 2009. In essence it says that the United States is willing to talk to North Korea, and maybe even 'reward' it with some monetary and political concessions, as long as North Korea does what the United States wants it to do--that is, starts dismantling its nuclear program. If it doesn't do so, the United States should, as strategic patience promoters insist, ignore North Korea's antics, since North Korea isn't going to be all that harmful anyway. A somewhat similar attitude seems to be dominant among the South Korean Right. These people believe that aid and political concessions make sense only if North Korean leaders agree to policies that are seen as 'rational' by Seoul."This reasoning might be attractive, but it seems to be unrealistic. North Korea has not the slightest desire to be left alone. Indeed, they cannot afford to be left alone. In order to compensate for the innate inefficiency of their economy, they need outside help, delivered on their specific conditions. So far, the best way to squeeze this aid has been to appear dangerous, unpredictable, and irrational. Therefore, they will continue to appear thus, attempting to cause more trouble for those countries and international forces from whom they hope to squeeze some resources. The alternative is not really attractive--either to survive on meager and perhaps diminishing returns of their nonfunctioning economy or to become excessively dependent on just one sponsor (China)."Lankov believes that the North cannot sustain itself and regime collapse is inevitable. When this will all happen is the question. The author supplied multiple scenarios of reunification, none of which involved a peaceful transition and blending of states. The irony is, as the Korean War falls further into history, more and more South Koreans do not want reunification. They see the costs they will have to bear to support their impoverished countrymen and say no thank-you. The mainland Chinese are worried that regime collapse will send a flood of starving unskilled North Koreans across its border, so they aim to keep the status quo. The international reaction is to leave the North Koreans to lie in their own threadbare bed, yet pretty soon the bedposts will rot and the mattress will fall down. What then? No one wants to deal with this inevitability.

I found this book when thinking about the recent controversy concerning the hacking of Sony Pictures systems, possibly by hackers located in or directed by North Korea. Rather than watch a film which had little appeal to me, The Interview, and which promised to provide only cliches about North Korea at best, I thought I would devote the time and money to finding a book which taught me something about Korean society, the nature of the regime in the north and the prospects for the future. Andrei Lankov's book more than met my expectations in this regard.My knowledge of Korean history and society was pretty minimal. I knew a little about the Korean war, but from a Western perspective. I know a little about Stalinist societies in Europe, having visited several many years ago, I have followed the reforms and changes in China, Vietnam and Eastern Europe, but North Korea remained something of a mystery. Lankov provides some background on the Japanese invasion of China, the rise of a guerilla movement in Korea in which Kim Il Sung was active, and his ruthless consolidation of his position as leader in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This is done in outline and is not too taxing. If you want more detail here, then Lankov and others have written much more detailed tomes. He goes on to describe the creation of an extremely controlling and oppressive Stalinist regime with an extraordinary degree of control over individuals and families, but also indicates that to some extent the regime delivered on its promises of a stable food supply and some industrial growth, with some external support from Russia and China. But this system was also extremely inefficient and relied upon continued ignorance of the progress being achieved in South Korea from the 1960s onwards.By the late 1980s the disparity between the two Koreas was massive, and the external support for North Korea began to fall away, with catastrophic results for the North Korea population. Lankov estimates that 500,000 people died, although there are higher estimates, as he acknowledges. Interestingly North Korean society changed through this period, with greater freedom being allowed to farmers and small traders to participate in markets and greater corruption and the rise of criminal businesses selling drugs and fake currency. But the extraordinarily oppressive controls of personal freedom remained largely intact and the suppression of anything resembling political debate, let alone dissent, continued. This system required a bureaucracy, a political force, a network of informers, and a cadre of technical experts, all of whom were rewarded to some extent, although the primary beneficiaries were the Kim family (ie the relatives and descendants of KIm Il Sung) who remain in power.Lankov argues that it is the maintenance of the power and privilege of this group, against the background of a much richer South Korea, which is the driving force behind many of the actions which capture international headlines - the attacks on South Korea, the testing of missiles, and the negotiations over the nuclear program. The alternative path of economic reform, tried so successfully in China under Deng Xiaoping, is simply not an option for the regime, which would implode or dissolve, Lankov argues, as the full extent of the economic mismanagement historically became clear. One of the strengths of this book is the comparison with various countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Lankov has his own perspective on these events and this adds to the richness of the narrative.The final section of the book considers scenarios for the medium term, and ways in which the poltical and economic development of North Korea might be assisted by South Korea and the US, and by China, which has become a significant trading partner. Lankov highlights the development of an industrial park and a tourist enclave just north of he DMZ as a very promising development, since it has allowed some greater access by North Koreans to the skills, technology and wage levels of the south, or at least another route by which such ideas might flow to the north. He also argues for much more support for refugees from the North, who tend to struggle in the highly competitive labour market of South Korea.I learnt a great deal from this book, which is informed by a deep knowledge of and interest in Korean history and sustained personal involvement, first as an exchange student and latterly as an academic researcher with the North. At the same time it would be wrong not to register a few critical comments. Lankov writes in a sprightly prose. This is not turgid or laboured. But it is complex and the presentation of the argument can be a bit schematic in places, with a set of options spelt out one by one.More substantively it would have been interesting to know more about the way in which China exerts its influence, or the lack thereof. Have the Chinese invested directly and if so to what extent and in what sectors ? What would the Chinese economy stand to lose, if that of North Korea collapsed. Perhaps not that much ? Similarly what kind of political dialogue or negotiation takes place, and how. Lankov remarks that the Chinese view North Korea with amused disdain, for a country which continues to follow a path which China abandoned several decades ago.And then there is the hacking. Lankov wrote this book several years ago and does not touch on this topic. He argues that the nuclear program continues to have some deterrent effect on the US and others, and that the regime occasionally acts with surprising aggression militarily, knowing that it is likely to get away with such acts, even though in a full scale war it would be rapidly destroyed. Against this background it would seem that hacking into US and other systems would be a powerful tool to use, and or at least threaten to use.

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It is very clear that the author knows his subject. It really is a very well researched and well argued summary of the state of affairs in North Korea. It might have been helpful to have looked in a bit more detail at the spiritual aspects of the area. NK was in the early 20th century a strongly Christian country but now holds the dubious distinction of being one of the worst persecutors of Christians worldwide. Meanwhile South Korea has seen a huge expansion of the church. It now sends out more missionaries than any nation apart from the USA despite having a fairly small population

Andrei Lankov’s history and analysis of North Korea is written in an interesting, accessible and engaging journalistic style. He paints a dire picture of contemporary life there. He offers prognoses for the future of North Korean society, and examines policy options for the rest of the world. Along with other authors on North Korea, he argues that the regime is rational, although in a Machiavellian sense, and the people more content than they were. This rationality is however very domain specific, and neither enlightened nor overall. He elsewhere presents the people as seriously oppressed.Minor quibbles are that the text is often repetitive, the argument at times goes round in circles, and Lankov uses the cumbersome device of referring to himself as ‘the present author’, and then writing in the third person.There is good coverage of the Kim dynasty and some of the general population, but insufficient coverage of the elite in between the two. Who are the people who devised Juche philosophy, or the people apparently capable of developing nuclear technology almost independently? Where did they come from, and whence their skills? How does the Kim dynasty interact with this elite? It matters, because it poses the question of whether the regime would simply collapse without the Kims, or whether an extensive power elite really controls the Kims and the country.

It is difficult to asses a book on a society that is as closed to the outside world as North Korea. But Lankov seems authoritative and consistent in his own personal recollections of life there, supported by a long list of documents. Also, he uses his own personal experience as a citizen of the former Soviet Union to explain subtleties that most probable would be lost for a westerner observer. The book, particularly its conclusions, reflects Lankov's dissatisfaction with the predominant views among policy makers (and the media) towards the "North Korea problem", and clearly shows how both hawkish and dovish strategies have so far failed to stop the Kim dynasty from pursuing the nuclear bomb option. The book's description of the origins of the current hereditary communist dictatorship, from the struggles of "idealists who wanted to bring a perfect world", resembles very much my own experience with similar (and more recent) developments in other countries and continents.Lankov is very aware his own suggestions on how to deal with the North Korean leadership are not attractive for politicians (and the media) keener on quick and drastic solutions to the "problem". Nevertheless, the grim perspective the book presents for the future if the current (or past) policies continue should make every government involved to consider Lankov's proposals.

With all the recent tensions regarding the USA and North Korea I thought it a good time to read about the North Korea government . The book is well written and hard to put down once you have started it. The book is most informative about the history of North Korea and the assessment of its economic position. The book also helps you understand its relationship with China and the former USSR. The conclusions of the book make sense as well. I cannot recommend this book enough for those who want to know more about North Korea.

A very good, concise and insightful introduction to the country. Avoids the all too familiar litany of lurid horror stories and instead presents some persuasive arguments about the tragic fate of the country and a sense of what it is like for those who have to live there.