The Russian Front: From Stalingrad to Kursk

My friend was there during the war and he wanted to relive it again.. He was disappointed that it was taken from military documents

This was a little disappointing. Professor Erickson certainly knows his stuff but at only 45 minutes, poor graphic maps and repeated footage it all left me wanting more. I'd rather read his books personally. Why is it that film makers out there just can't seem to get these type of DVDs right??

The presentation was excellent. A military history buff like myself enjoyed the maps, commentary and the film. The film has some repeated viewing from the old Battlefield of the 1990s. Overall, recommended to gain further understanding of this largely unknown theater until the last 10 years.

This documentary starts in the autumn of 1942 when, by October, the Germans occupied 7/8th of Stalingrad and planned a final offensive for November 18, by which time it was already too late, given the Soviet counter-offensive of November 19 on the flanks of Army Group B which Hitler had fatally weakened in his pigheaded pursuit of Stalingrad. It ends with Zitadel (battle of Kursk) after some discussion of Guderian's recall to active service in 1943 to rebuild the severely battered Panzer forces and of the dissenting opinions on when to start Zitadell, immediately, i.e. mid-May, with smaller forces (von Manstein), or later, i.e. late June/early July, with built-up forces, reinforced with Tigers, the new Panthers and Ferdinands (Guderian). There is some, but not much, coverage of von Manstein's masterful elastic defense in the Don region following Stalingrad and his successful counter-offensive culminating in the recapture of Kharkov.As with the first two DVDs, this third one, in a series of four, is valuable more for its interview with Professor John Erickson ( The Road to Berlin (Stalin's War with Germany Volume II) (Cassell Military Paperbacks) , The Road to Stalingrad (Cassell Military Paperbacks) ) than for the footage and its narration which are of average quality at best.There are minor errors, such as:-General Paulus referred to as `von Paulus" (a common mistake that you'll find even in Craig's "Enemy at the Gates");-The map shows von Manstein's abortive relief force (operation "Wintergewitter") coming from the northwest while in fact the drive was from the southwest;-Stalingrad is said to be 500 miles west of the German lines by spring 1943 (obviously it's east).But there is a major error: the narration (not Professor Erickson who certainly knows better) states that von Manstein gave the order for the breakout of Stalingrad to begin and that Paulus disobeyed him. That is seriously inaccurate and implies to the viewer that the responsibility for the debacle at Stalingrad lay squarely with Paulus and Hitler while 6th Army would have been saved had von Manstein's orders been executed. It is not an uncommon misconception: one will find it in  Collins Atlas of World War II , on page 85. That misconception is the intended result from von Manstein's self justifying memoirs "Verlorene Siege" ( Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General ) where he deflected responsibility upwards to Hitler and downwards to Paulus for the Stalingrad debacle. That myth, prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, has long since been debunked. To summarize, and to quote from note 315 on page 977 of Kershaw's  Hitler: 1936-1945: Nemesis : "Manstein had to share some of the blame for the catastrophe".The battle of Stalingrad has been the subject of entire books, such as, among the better ones:Craig's  Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad (Movie Tie-In) Hayward's  Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943 (Modern War Studies) Beevor's  Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943 Not to mention Glantz's massive Stalingrad trilogy.But, the most thorough analysis of responsibilities and failures for Stalingrad is in  Stalingrad: Memories and Reassessments (Cassell Military Paperbacks) where the roles of von Manstein and Paulus (as well as von Seydlitz) are analyzed in great detail. To summarize very cursorily, the reader has to distinguish between break-through to the relieving forces (operation "Wintergewitter"), building and consolidating a re-supply and reinforcement corridor to 4th Panzer Army while holding on to the Volga, and break-out (operation "Donnerschlag"), the abandonment of the Volga and of Stalingrad in a desperate attempt to reach Army Group Don's frontline. The critical time-span was 18 to 23 December as is reflected in the telex messages of 19 December, just as the relieving forces, LVII corps, could not advance further towards Stalingrad, and 23 December, when the relief offensive Winter Storm had failed. Those telex messages show ambiguous orders on 19 and the express order to not abandon Stalingrad, until further orders, on 23.Excerpts from that book:P 200-201 : "The second critical high point in the fate of 6th Army came about in the days immediately before Christmas 1942, when the spearheads of the relieving forces of 57th Panzer Corps had fought their way to within about 50 km of the pocket. Once again there was a chance for a breakout."... "Two interconnected operations: `Winter storm' ["Wintergewitter"] which aimed at opening up a supply corridor with active support by 6th Army while maintaining the positions on the Volga; the break out operation `Thunderclap' ["Donnerschlag"] which aimed at shrinking the pocket and giving up Stalingrad"...P 150-151: "But, did he [von Manstein], as he wishes us to gather from his memoirs, actually issue the decisive order for the start of Operation "Thunderclap"...thereby relieving General Paulus from the responsibility of acting on his own authority against the orders of the Supreme Command?...Sixth Army never received this order...On 23 December 1942, ... von Manstein put him [Paulus] off by declaring that he could not yet give him the authorization [to break-out]".I refer the critical reader to that book to form his own opinion as to the respective guilt of Paulus and von Manstein in the Stalingrad debacle. It is not an easy analysis. The telex messages between Army (Paulus) and Army Group (von Manstein) Commands of the crucial days can be found in Craig's Enemy at the gates: pages 252-257 for the exchanges of December 19 and pages 277-279 for those of December 23. A short 3 page summary of the Stalingrad battle is found on P 543-545 of Kershaw's Nemesis. A more detailed military (i.e. no responsibilities analysis) analysis is found on P 479-502 of Ziemke's  Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the east .

A comprehensive history of a terrible war! They gave and received no mercy!

very good footage. good documentary.

Item was as described and arrived quickly.

Outstanding transaction. Highly recommend.

WHY CHARGE ME ITEM RETURN FEES...?!

Moving on where the first left off, this is just as great with archival footage and excellent commentary. Insights are first rate. A great buy.