The Other Half of Macroeconomics and the Fate of Globalization

Although Koo is a radical Keynesian, I must say his Balance Sheet Recession concept actually makes sense. And the data backs it up.I first read his older book about the QE Trap and very much found his ideas worthwhile in my own analytics and trading strategies.This book also does a great job explaining why the economics profession has continued to overestimate the global economy and why so much Central Bank stimulus has done roughly nothing to help. I just wish it covered a bit more about the world’s Quantitative Tightening and such.It’s worth the read - even if you’re not a Keynesian - to see his unique and sobering point of view in a profession that’s become reckless and, frankly, destructive.

Should be a required auxiliary reading on any course on macro economics, trade theory or growth

I picked this book up from the library economics section, and am very glad that I did. In this quick read, Koo ties his experiences with the japanese economic cycles with the global economic landscape today. He makes you think about assumptions which are easy to assume blindly in casual reading of the news, or other books. He frames Quantitative Easing in very real terms of how this money impacts the economy, the role of investors compared to the role of those with businesses receiving investment, and innovation. Some of my favorite parts were diagrams showing how the rate family savings interact with other forms of debt.

I read a lot about issues related to economic cycles and the formation of crises. I found explanations in the book very interesting and different from those usually offered. It is not only the author's main theory that revisits economic development, but also references to various aspects of macroeconomics. Highly recommend to anyone who is engaged in the profession and to the reader who is interested in the subject.

All Chancellors of Exchequer and Staff should read this.It suggests ways to maximise your economy. Roseveldt , H....r, and many Japanese chancellors did it.

Maravilloso libro lleno de aprendizaje y conocimiento. Ha pasado a ser un economista de referencia absoluta en mi estudio. Un must para cualquier economista

This is a great book. I think have read only first 80 pages twice. Great book and loved the way way data was put. Incisive!

If there is one thing every diligent voter should do, it is to try and spend some time to understand the basics of how economies work because without it, you will continue to fall for cliche and propaganda. I am not going to write a summary of the contents of this book but I will point out that some reviews do not accurately reflect what the book is all about and seem to be displaying the symptoms of why such a mess was made of the economy and the long years of decline that we have experienced.The thrust of the book is that traditional thinking in economics by the likes of Mervyn King, Draghi et al lead to serious and avoidable errors post 2008 and that tragically, there were lessons to learn from Japan's experiences post 1990. The IMF and the World Bank and closer to home the BOE and ECB all made the same errors.In theory, all of the money pumped into the economies via QE should have lead to inflation and stimulus. We all think we understand the rise of hyperinflation in pre WW2 Germany and are programmed to to fear anything that risks that occurring. No such inflation occurred despite the amount of money pumped into the economy. Neither did the expected timescale for the upturn occur because those in charge (except in America as pointed out by the author) got it wrong.Most voters think they understand a country's economy as an extensive version of a household budget. This was pedalled by Thatcher trying to pretend the Chancellor was in fact nothing more than a housewife with an extremely large purse. She knew it was nonsense of course but it went into the common psyche because it appeared to make sense. An addition to this nonsense is the Magic Money Tree. Money does appear out of nowhere and the vast majority is created by private banks through loans.Do yourself a favour and read this book and/or others by people who actually understood and predicted the 2008 crash. As one of the reviewers cited on the sleeve says "Except for dogmatists and anti-humanitarians, it is required reading"

Shortly after the recession of 2008, holders of government bonds were given the opportunity to park them with the Bank of England in return for new money. They were expected to use this cash for investment - lending to businesses, starting up new infrastructure projects, that sort of thing. Instead, what they did was to put the money in the banking system, which then placed it back with the Bank of England. The looked-for boost in investment didn't happen, and the result is the shadow in which we live. And this book.Richard Koo saw a few decades ago that the reason Japan remained in economic doldrums was that borrowers were loath to borrow - no matter how low the interest rate they were offered. They had become so risk-averse that all they wanted to do was to reduce their debts. Individually, this makes sense. When the entire economy does this, it sparks what is called a balance-sheet recession, leading to a country tanking. The only counter can be massive spending by the government. Koo claims that this didn't happen enough post-2008, which is why we're in the mess we're in now.As others have pointed out, this is somewhat disingenuous. The debt burdens of many countries shot up from 2008 onwards. This then triggered austerity as the governments decided to reduce the debt. Safety nets collapsed. There was general economic malaise, social disturbances, Brexit etc.Koo's book is a fine primer on basic macroeconomics. His latter concentration on balance sheets then becomes a bit narrow, ignoring other possible factors that cause recessions. It would have been useful to see some innovative solutions to the issues he raises. Instead, he hearkens back to old ideas. Here, a trick is surely missed.