Moscow 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March

Napoleon’s Russian campaign of 1812 is legendary – and rightfully so. All I knew about it before reading Adam Zamoyski’s “Moscow, 1812: Napoleon’s Fatal March” was that the Russian winter defeated Napoleon’s Grand Armee. I had no idea how horrific the whole experience was for soldiers and civilians, alike, nor the historical context in which the campaign unfolded.Perhaps the greatest tragedy is that the whole campaign was basically without purpose, at least according to Zamoyski. Napoleon felt that Russian Tsar Alexander was not living up to his commitments under the Treaty of Tilsit. The Russians had amassed forces on the borders of the Polish Duchy of Warsaw and had collaborated with England in defiance of the Napoleonic Continental System. This was an affront too blatant for the Emperor to ignore. In Zamoyski’s assessment, “In effect, [Napoleon] had assembled the greatest army the world had ever seen, with no defined purpose. And, by definition, aimless wars cannot be won.”The great eastward march of the Grand Armee finally pinioned the Russian army at the insignificant village crossroads of Borodino. In what Zamoyski calls a “lackluster performance,” Napoleon guided the battle from deep behind the front lines. The Russians stood their ground and absorbed the absolute worst the Grand Armee could dish out. “It had been the greatest massacre in recorded history,” Zamoyski writes, “not to be surpassed until the first day of the Somme in 1916.”“According to the parameters by which [Napoleon], and most European states and statesmen, operated, he had won the war,” according to the author. The Grand Armee marched out of Borodino confident that the campaign was over. Their attention was focused on the booty they might be able to carry back home to Western Europe. They could have – and should have – pursued the wrecked wastage of Kutuzov’s Russian army. “In the only brilliant decision he made during the whole campaign,” Zamoyski notes irreverently, “Kutuzov resolved to sacrifice Moscow in order to save his army.”All of Russia mourned the loss of their traditional capital. The Tsar’s guardian of the city, Count Fyodor Rostopchin, vowed to destroy it rather than allow Napoleon to have it. The Grand Armee would spend five purposeless weeks in the burned out shell of a city, time mostly spent acquiring booty from the homes spared from Rostopchin’s conflagration. “Napoleon had climbed into a grave from which he would never emerge,” Zamoyski writes, “and the Russian nation would triumph.”Ironically, Zamoyski says, the “somnolent Kutuzov” was the “perfect man for the moment, as time was working for the Russians and against the French.” While the Russian army regrouped itself south of Moscow, the Grand Armee loaded itself down with anything and everything of value that could be transported by man or beast. “It was no longer the army of Napoleon but that of Darius returning from a far-flung expedition, more lucrative than glorious,” according to one French officer. By early October, Napoleon reluctantly decided to withdraw, basically declaring victory and returning home. “Napoleon’s military success in the past had rested on his capacity to make a quick appraisal of any situation and to act intelligently and decisively on its basis, “Zamoyski writes. “Yet from the moment he set out on his ‘Second Polish War’ he displayed a marked inability either to make the correct appraisal or to act decisively.” The Emperor’s indecision and faulty judgments would doom his army.Zamoyski, who quotes liberally from contemporary diaries and journals, describes the Grand Armee’s strategic withdrawal from Russian in painful detail. By early November the weather had turned brutally cold with temperatures regularly dipping to 30 degrees below zero Fahrenheit. How anyone could survive such conditions is beyond comprehension. The horrors of the march are laid out in page after page of almost indescribable human suffering: frost bite, starvation, lice, typhus, and eventually cannibalism. All the while, the remnants of Kutuzov’s Russian army, mounted Cossacks especially, harried the Grand Armee. French soldiers weighted down with booty and lacking winter clothes, were easy pickings.“I beat the Russians every time,” Napoleon is said to have ranted, but that was beside the point. His army was defeated nevertheless. Zamoyski estimates that the Grand Armee was 500,000 to 600,000 strong in June of 1812 and that only 120,000 came back in December. Of the 400,000 casualties, he estimates that only a quarter were killed in combat, the rest succumbed to the elements. Russian losses are thought to be roughly equivalent. All told, perhaps a million people died between the Grand Armee’s crossing the Nieman at the end of June 1812 and the end of February 1813. To this can be added the loss of some 160,000 horses and a thousand cannon.Napoleon’s entry into Moscow may very well have represented the high water mark of his dazzling career. As Zamoyski notes, the defeat had “punctured the general conviction that he was invincible and tarnished the aura of superiority surrounding his person.” The fate of the French Empire would run mostly downhill from the winter of 1812. The historical impact of the defeat was enormous, according to Zamoyski. “His own defeat and France’s resultant eclipse as a Great Power had paved the way for the dominance of both Russia and Prussia. They used that dominance to protect a status quo that impeded social, national, and religious emancipation, economic enterprise and political development in central Europe, thereby generating militant nationalisms and creating tensions that led to revolution and upheaval in the first two decades of the twentieth century and fed the ideologies which accounted for tens of millions of lives in the third, fourth, and fifth decades.”All told, a brilliant military history of one of the great military disasters.

One can learn many things from "Napoleon 1812." We realize once again, that: human behavior and human history tend to repeat themselves.Author Adam Zamoyski begins with the historical background and contemporary political climate of the prelude to Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Napoleon's France was the major European superpower, and the strongest nation in Europe diplomatically, and militarily France was financially well-off due to the Continental System of trade during this period.In the prelude to the invasion of Russia, the French mainstream media (only newspapers and flyers back then) beat a steady drum beat for war with Russia. Ubiquitous nationalism, jingoistic flag waving, and publicly showing "support" on one's sleeve. The air of optimism. As the day of departure for hundreds of thousands of troops came, nationalism increased to higher and higher levels, crescendoing into a peak of "irrational exuberance" in Paris. Sound familiar? And from Paris, the troops left on their march, marching all the way to Moscow.The fervent and boisterous French were sure of victory, and discounted any potentially negative and dire consequences of invading Russia in the days of horse and carriage. Slowly traversing the vast Russian landscape with soldiers and food supply-lines during Spring, Summer, and in the paralyzing, deadly Russian Winters. Scarce food and firewood for warmth, icy roads, semi-frozen rivers, muddy, slippery roads, and slop, for travel.CROSSING THE NIEMEN RIVER:The historical and militaristic significance of crossing the Niemen river, which is, the real entrance into Russia:After crossing the Niemen, time and time again, Napoleon's forces battled and lost their constant fight with mother nature. And, most of the casualties of the Grand Army actually occurred during the Spring and Summer due to starvation, desertion, suicide, and typhus, etc. Ill troops and high casualties depleted the ranks. In Winter, lethal temperatures, slippery roads and icy rivers, constantly bogged down this massive logistical operation.Transportation routes and local food were sparse. And all of these circumstances were in a hostile land they had invaded. In addition to organized Russian army battles, the Russian partisans and Cossacks frequently inflicted casualties and damage by hitting and running, often waiting for Grand Army stragglers to fall behind the pack.When The Grand Army reached Moscow they expected a welcome from Moscow's mayor and local leaders This was customary during those times. Conquerors and occupiers were treated like guests by the weaker, defeated nation. Instead, the Grand Army met the "Scorched Earth Strategy." Moscow was literally burning to the ground. Criminals and the mentally ill were released from prisons to roam the streets for the occupiers to deal with.There was no livestock, therefore no food. All livestock animals had been taken out of the city. Animals not able to be evacuated, were killed so nothing of value would be left to the invaders. There was nobody there, but some of the Muscovite citizens who unable to get out of Moscow. And after this, these same hundreds of thousands of Grand Army men, would have to march all the way back to Central Europe. Fending off the attacking cossacks, starvation, disease, and fatal Winter, along they way.Instance after instance, the troops, their horses, cannons/weapons, and food supplies got stuck in the mud. Even Napoleon himself, fell and slid down icy slopes. Horses drowned in icy rivers while trying to cross them.The supply line of food became clogged as the Russian Winter set in. Lacking food and basic living supplies, soldiers fought each other over food and goods, pillaging and stealing from each other. Survival or death was at stake. Small groups would trek out on the frozen swaths of barren land to forage for food. What little they usually found was rotten. If a few soldiers found a hut to light a fire inside to escape sub-zero temperatures, other soldiers would relentlessly bombard the hut trying to enter in order to try to save their own lives.The Decimation of Napoleon's forces was slow, steady, methodical, and brutal. The Winter, Russians, and relentless Cossacks stalked the French forces as they retreated. Always waiting for a horse's bridle to break, a wagon wheel to fall off, or a group of soldiers to fall behind the pack. Once this happened, the vulnerable and out-numbered stragglers were killed, and lifted of any valuable they had.Many times throughout this book I was reminded of Hitler's decision to invade Russia (USSR) in "Operation Barbarossa." Hitler sent his troops in Russia on September 30th, with no Winter clothes. Like Napoleon, Hitler was so optimistic that he falsely believed he'd make it to Moscow before Winter. And, nearly 120 years later, the Winter and people fought back and won.There are many astutely drawn diagrams detailing the movement of forces, and drawings and sketches on the same page as the written description.Out of 690,000 of the International Grand Army soldiers (less than 50% were French) that left for Russia, less than half ever returned. Casualties were approximately 400,000. In the beginning of this campaign, there was a lust for power and domination. In the end, there was massive defeat, tragedy, and embarrassment.This book uses historical facts, interviews, writings, and drawings by those involved.This book was well written and well researched, and very descriptive.

This book and the research which went into it thoroughly impressed me!It was an edge-of-your seat read, especially since this is the true unvarnished story of the war of 1812, pieced together by meticulous research, including museums, historical societies, and down to the letters the soldiers on both fronts wrote to their loved ones.It is a tale of the human psyche, of what happens when leaders are swayed by the voices of politics, or by their own egos. It is also a tale of just how indestructible we humans are. Of when faced with the ultimate, with circumstances outright gruesome, how strong our will to live is, how much we will endure; and what lengths we are willing to go to for that which we hold dearest.And in 2021, it gives fresh understanding to what underpins our geopolitical situation.You read this book, and it will change you as a human being. Will stay with you for the rest of your life, in the manner just a few of the classics are able.

I love history from a lot of different eras. Military history is supposed to help people learn from mistakes but obviously Napoleon knew nothing about Charles XII of Sweden’s invasion or attempted invasion of Russia. He was a great military leader but he stayed too long in Russia. Decided by the Battle of Poltova in the Ukraine, it ended not only Sweden’s interests in Russia but it was also the beginning of the decline of the Swedish monopoly in Northern Europe.Whereas Napoleon was a tactician similarity to Charles XII ends there. He was very astute and studied everything in regards to a battle. I suppose the adage, the lie of the land is very applicable here. The author does a great job in painting a broad canvas which was the whole of the Russian campaign.I enjoyed everything about this period of in Franco- Russian history. It brought together two allies, Alexander 1 and Napoleon turned into enemies. I gave this book to my brother who like me loves history and military history books. It’s one book I should have kept.The surprising thing about Napoleon is that he was no fool, but he was foolish not to listen to his generals. History unfortunately or maybe in this case luckily has a habit of repeating itself; as the world was to witness nearly 150 years later a certain gentleman by the name of Adolf Hitler made the same mistake as both Charles XII and Napoleon did.I have already bought Adam Zamoyski’s book on Napoleon since I’ve already read this.

Absolutely brilliant at describing the atrocious horrors of the Napoleonic campaign in Russia in terms of the vast loss of life in terms of men and horses.Zamojski does a very good job at exposing how far Napoleon's decision-making powers were on the wain at the outset of this campaign. The Emperor had lost that energy and decisiveness that had so characterised his earlier campaigns and this was to have fateful consequences for the Grande Armee. On reaching Moscow, having encountered no significant opposition, he seemed to sink into a state of inactivity - unsure of what his next move should be. Unfortunately for those under him, this was to lead to a disastrous state of affairs, particularly in terms of the lack of winter clothing for his troops, provisions and fodder for both the men and horses on the journey back, and the incorrect timing of the retreat from the Russian capital.Living in Poland as an Englishman, the book brings to the reader the true epic scale of this European conflict that dragged in most of the major powers. Napoleon's attitude to Poland was a particularly treacherous one; he was quite happy to use the superb Polish soldiers to fight in his army without granting them any major concessions in terms of restoring their nationhood since he was still hoping to appease Tsar Alexander, despite his war against him. At the end of the book, the Emperor is exposed as an unforgiving taskmaster who ruthlessly abandoned his army for the sake of his own political convenience.

Adam Zamoyski has written a brilliant, compelling and harrowing account of Napoleon's catastrophic invasion of Russia. It's over 550 pages in paperback but highly readable and expertly interwoven with extracts from diaries. There are plenty of excellent maps to provide a clear picture of the strategic positions and key battles. If you think you know the story then this is really worth another look.But don't buy this paperback edition by William Collins if you want to see the Illustrations because they're missing, all 60 of them, despite being listed at the front (hence only 3 stars). This is inexcusable, what kind of publisher could be so useless?

Apologies to the author as this review has nothing to do with the quality of the content. I have to share my disappointment as to the quality of the paperback publication. The font is tiny and the print setting is heavily biased towards the spine making it quite unreadable without folding it completely flat every page turn. Of course it may be that this doesn’t affect any particular individual’s enjoyment, it did mine. Returned for a refund and bought the hardback instead.

Excellent book. Superbly written. A detailed history ( but not dryly so) of the build up to, the invasion of and eventual retreat from Russia. This is a highly readable and credible piece of writing. Unreservedly recommended for anyone with even a slight interest this huge debacle. The conditions for the troops into and back out from Russia are especially harrowing and graphic. I particularly liked too, the authors excellent dissemination of myth surrounding the performance of Kutuzov the Russian C-in-C. Highly illuminating.